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Abbreviations and acronyms
Additionality Additionality refers to effects that are 
 attributable to a programme and, therefore, 
 would not occur in the absence of the 
 program. Thus, without additionality there 
 would be no programme benefits and costs.
AME expenditures AME expenditures include payments such as 
 those for training subsidies and transportation 
 reimbursements. (AME refers to Annually 
 Managed Expenditures.)
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis attempts to quantify, in 
 monetary terms, the value of as many of 
 the consequences of these programmes as 
 possible to determine whether their benefits 
 outweigh their costs.
CBF Cost Benefit Framework provides guidance 
 on how Department for Work and Pensions 
 (DWP) cost-benefit analyses should be 
 conducted and reported.
Cost-effectiveness Cost-effectiveness pertains to programme 
 benefits relative to programme costs, usually 
 expressed as the pounds of benefits per 
 pound invested.
DEL-A expenditures DEL-A expenditures include the     
 administrative costs incurred by DWP in
 running programmes. (DEL refers to
 Departmental Expenditure Limit.)
DEL-P expenditures DEL-P expenditures include the costs of the 
 contracted-out provisions of programmes.
x Abbreviations and acronyms
DWP Department for Work and Pensions.
Deadweight losses Deadweight losses are reductions in economic 
 welfare that result from distortions to 
 economic incentives. These distortions are 
 most often attributable to taxes or subsidies.
Displacement effects Displacement effects occur if a firm expands 
 at the expense of other firms because its 
 employment costs are subsidised by the 
 government.
Distributional weights Distributional weights attempt to adjust 
 benefits and costs for the possibility that a 
 pound that is received by a low income 
 household may be of greater value than a 
 pound that is received by a high income 
 household.
Employment and training Employment and training programmes 
programmes provide services (e.g. job search, training, 
 and subsidised jobs) to non-workers on benefits 
 to help them move into paid employment.
IB Incapacity benefits are cash benefits available 
 to disabled persons and persons with health 
 problems who are not working or who are 
 working only a few hours.
Impacts Impacts are programme effects (e.g. on 
 employment and benefit receipts) on 
 programme participants. 
IS Income Support is a non-contributory, income- 
 assessed benefit available to people who are 
 not required to work.
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance provides cash benefits 
 to unemployed persons who are actively 
 seeking work.
Micro-simulation model Micro-simulation models use data on 
 individuals (i.e. micro-data) to predict how 
 changes in government programmes will 
 affect individuals and what the changes will 
 cost the government.
xiAbbreviations and acronyms
Multiplier Multiplier is a value greater than one that 
 is used to adjust estimates of expenditures 
 if it is expected that they generate benefits to 
 the economy that exceed their immediate 
 value. 
NDDP New Deal for Disabled People is a voluntary 
 programme that provides counselling and 
 services through Job Brokers to help the 
 disabled and people with health problems 
 enter employment.
NDLP New Deal for Lone Parents is a voluntary 
 programme that provides counselling and 
 services through Jobcentre Plus to help 
 unemployed and economically inactive lone 
 parents enter employment.
Net benefits Net benefits are the benefits of a programme 
 less the costs of the programme.
Product market corrector Product market corrector is a value greater 
 than one that is used to adjust estimates of 
 programme impacts on earnings when the 
 social value of the output workers produce 
 exceeds their wages.
Scale problems Scale problems pertain to difficulties that arise 
 in comparing the cost-effectiveness of 
 programmes of greatly different sizes.
Sensitivity tests Sensitivity tests are used to determine how 
 estimates of benefits and cost change when 
 the assumptions on which they are based are 
 changed.
Substitution effects Substitution effects occur if participants in a 
 programme take jobs that individuals who 




Aims and research methods
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) developed the Cost Benefit 
Framework (CBF) guidance in an attempt to systematically assess the relative 
and actual cost-effectiveness of its policies and programmes in a consistent way. 
The primary purpose of the framework is to try to ensure that public funds are 
spent efficiently so that they generate the greatest net benefits to society. The 
framework was developed in consultation with analysts from across DWP, as well 
as representatives from Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the academic and 
evaluation sectors.
In 2006, DWP reviewed its employment programmes during the Comprehensive 
Spending Review and tried to apply the CBF guidance across all employment 
programmes for the first time, to look at the comparative cost-effectiveness of 
programmes using data on costs and performance in 2004/05. This analysis, which 
reported cost-effectiveness ratios for each studied programme, has not been 
published externally. Following the experience of trying to apply the CBF for the first 
time, the Department internally reviewed how effective the exercise had been and 
has been implementing several revisions to the CBF guidance to improve its cost-
benefit analyses (CBAs). The objective of this report is, therefore, to critically review 
the CBF and suggest possible improvements in analyses conducted under it.
A critical review was made of all the pertinent written DWP documents provided 
to us by the project manager. These included the draft CBF guidance itself, the 
2004/05 and 2005/06 CBA results that were available at the time this report was 
being written (March 2007), internal CBF guidance review documents and available 
league tables. The review examined these and assessed how improvements could 
be made to these in the short term. In addition, on specific points that arose 
from the review of DWP documents, the cost-benefit literature was addressed. In 
particular, the review attempted to examine how to improve the consistency of 
the evaluation evidence base for programmes in order to improve comparability 
across the CBAs. To inform the review further, interviews were made with DWP 
analysts who are involved with the CBF cost-benefit studies.
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 Summary
Key findings and conclusions
The report discusses a number of steps that might be taken to improve the CBF 
guidance and the underlying CBAs. The CBAs that are being conducted with the 
CBF guidance are improving over time. The purpose of this report is to contribute 
to this improvement.
The CBF guidance and internally produced CBAs were lacking complete and 
up-to-date detailed documentation on how the estimates were produced, and it 
was stated that this was due to the lack of time available for their production. This 
reduced both the consistency across the CBAs and the ability to assess the CBA 
and the steps involved in producing estimates. This documentation should include 
formulations, data sources, judgements and assumptions made, sensitivity analyses 
applied and a discussion of any weaknesses in evidence. A key recommendation 
is to ensure that for all CBAs, documentary evidence describing the CBA steps is 
produced as part of their construction, and that it is maintained for any subsequent 
alterations. 
Also, the CBF guidance should specify clearly how the number of additional jobs 
should be determined, for both the cases where net impacts on employment 
and benefits are available and when they are not available. Detail on the process 
of determining the average wage paid at the jobs where former programme 
participants are employed should also be added to the CBF guidance. 
The remainder of the recommendations are summarised with an indication 
distinguishing those with the highest priority in our opinion, and those with lower 
priority. The ease and speed with which these can be implemented is also indicated. 
Of the high priority recommendations, only three would take a long time to 
implement; those that remain are relatively easy and quick to implement. The high 
priority recommendations are listed here. The lower priority recommendations are 
not listed here but can be found in the conclusions. 
High priority/short-term recommendations
• Apart from ensuring net impact estimates on employment are made available 
for programmes as much as possible, where net impact estimates are missing, 
documentation should be produced on the formulation and data sources, 
judgements and assumptions of any substitute information made as part of the 
CBA, and sensitivity analyses applied, together with discussion of the implications 
of the weak evidence base for the CBA, when substitutions are made for net 
impacts (Section 2.3).
• When estimates of impacts on employment exist for multiple time periods, use 
the largest one for determining the number of additional jobs resulting from 
employment and training programmes (Section 2.4).
• When the impact on net earnings is unavailable for a programme, the substitute 
information that is used instead should be carefully documented and sensitivity 
analyses applied, together with a discussion of the implications for the CBA 
(Section 2.7).
• When certain benefits and costs are not incorporated into the estimates of net 
benefits, the implications of their omission need to be discussed in reporting the 
cost-benefit findings (Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and elsewhere).
• We do not recommend reporting estimates of the monetary values of programme 
impacts on difficult to monetise outcomes such as health, self-esteem, child-
welfare, and life-satisfaction until reliable estimates of these impacts become 
available (Section 3.2). 
• Drop the product market corrector that is currently used (Section 3.5). 
• Do not use a multiplier in estimating net benefits unless unemployment rates 
are high (Section 3.6).
• Use Jobcentre Plus historical annual cost accounts for the year closest to the 
programme impact estimates (Chapter 4).
• Ideally, both programme benefits and costs should be measured after the 
programme has reached a steady state, but to the extent this is not feasible, 
exclude start-up or set-up costs in estimating programme costs (Section 4.1). 
• Include Departmental Expenditure Limit administrative (DEL-A) costs from 
Jobcentre Plus annual cost accounts where they exist for a programme, and when 
including them in the CBA divide by the number of programme participants to 
get a measure comparable across programmes (Section 4.1).
• Report judgements, data sources and assumptions for cost estimates together 
with discussion of any weaknesses in evidence and the implications for the CBA 
(Section 4.1). 
• In conducting sensitivity analyses, make alternative assumptions concerning the 
value of the loss of non-market time (i.e. ‘leisure’) that occurs when programme 
participants enter employment (Section 4.3).
• The likely importance or unimportance of general equilibrium effects should be 
discussed in presenting findings from the CBF CBAs (Section 4.5). 
• Sensitivity tests should be conducted of estimated net benefits to see if 
programme ranking changes when alternative assumptions are made. Section 
5.5 provides a suggested list of these tests.
• Strong consideration should be given to replacing the net-benefits-per-additional-
job ratios that are currently used to rank programmes with net-benefits-per-
participant ratios (Section 5.6).
• Although it is necessary to rank programmes on the basis of ratios, great care 
should be exercised in reporting and interpreting the resulting ranking because 
the ratios are inevitably subject to serious scale problems (Section 5.6).
Summary
4High priority/middle- or long-term recommendations
• Net impacts should be estimated more often, ideally for all programmes, 
using valid evaluation designs to estimate employment impacts and impacts 
on being off benefits. Doing this necessitates timely consideration of the 
data requirements, particularly before the outset of a new programme 
(Section 2.1).
• It is important to allow job duration values that are used in the CBF CBAs to vary 
by target group in a way that reflects how they actually differ, even when the 
precise values are unknown (Section 2.6).
• When an early brief CBA exists, together with a later independent or more 
carefully constructed CBA for the same programme, then the former CBA 
should be compared and updated. This is already done on an ongoing basis 
and should continue (Section 5.4).
Summary
1 Introduction and  
 background
1.1 Background
CBA is a tool that has often been used to assess Government-funded social 
programmes such as those that try to move individuals from benefit programmes 
into work. It attempts to quantify, in monetary terms, the value of as many of 
the consequences of these programmes as possible to determine whether their 
benefits outweigh their costs from a societal point of view and, hence, whether 
the programme is economically efficient. It can also be used to indicate whether 
the programme improves the well-being of those who participate in it and what 
the net effect of the programme is on the government’s budget. In addition, it 
can be used to rank programmes from each of these three perspectives − that is, 
from the point of view of society as a whole, the government and the programme 
participant. CBA can be conducted prior to introducing a programme to help 
determine whether the benefits from the programme are likely to exceed its costs 
or after the programme is underway, to help determine whether more or fewer 
resources should be spent on it.1
The DWP has developed CBF guidance that it uses to conduct CBAs of its policies 
and programmes. The CBF guidance is usually applied to ongoing programmes 
and the focus is usually on two of the three perspectives mentioned above − the 
social (or economy-wide) perspective and the Government (or fiscal or Exchequer) 
perspective. The framework is used to attempt to rank DWP programmes in terms 
of their relative cost-effectiveness in a systematic and consistent way. The primary 
purpose of doing this is to help ensure that public funds are spent efficiently so that 
they generate the greatest net benefits to society. The framework was developed 
in consultation with analysts from across DWP, as well as representatives from 
HMT, DTI, DfES and the academic and evaluation sectors. 
1 For greater detail on the uses of cost-benefit analysis, as well as the methods 
involved in applying it and issues concerning its application, see HM Treasury’s 
Green	Book (2003) and Boardman (2006).
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success factor by which most DWP active labour market programmes are judged2. 
The CBF guidance focuses on the net impact of programmes, i.e. it is only concerned 
with the benefits arising from job entries that would not have happened in the 
absence of the programme. Thus, DWP’s CBF guidance uses two main measures 
of cost-effectiveness: (a) net benefits to the Exchequer that result from additional 
jobs; and (b) net benefits to the economy that result from additional jobs. Both 
these measures are intended to be indicative and are not meant to be considered 
in isolation but interpreted alongside other evidence. In general net benefits to the 
Exchequer are easier and more straightforward to estimate than the broader net 
benefits to the economy. Appendix B gives more details about these measures. 
In 2006 DWP reviewed its employment programmes to inform policy decisions 
around priorities during the Comprehensive Spending Review. As part of this work, 
DWP tried to apply the CBF guidance across all employment programmes for the 
first time to look at the comparative cost-effectiveness of programmes using data 
on costs and performance in 2004/05. Due to the timescales involved this work 
was done quickly and consequently had to rely upon readily available evidence 
to inform its assumptions and produce the estimates. This was an acknowledged 
limitation of the work given that the available evidence varies considerably between 
programmes. In light of this, analysts in the Department were keen not to read 
too much into the detail but to consider only the broader messages emerging 
from the results and how these might be interpreted alongside other evidence. 
The analysis, which was based on league tables that reported cost-effectiveness 
ratios for each studied programme, has not been published externally. 
Following the experience of trying to apply the CBF for the first time, the 
Department internally reviewed how effective the exercise had been and has 
been implementing several revisions to the CBF guidance to improve its CBA. The 
Department also considered this an opportune time to seek independent expert 
advice to report on the work to date, the improvements being made as well as 
the ways in which we might improve the framework further in the medium- to 
longer-term. 
The objective of this report is to critically review the CBF guidance and suggest 
possible improvements in analyses conducted under it. The review critically 
assesses the way in which the CBF guidance has been applied. It also reviews the 
Department’s current effort to update and refine its cost-benefit estimates. The 
appropriateness of the revisions being made to the methodology is assessed and 
recommendations are made about how these estimates can be improved in the 
short-term using existing evidence. Finally, the review considers how the CBF and 
the way it is applied can be enhanced by improving the quality and consistency 
of the evidence on which it relies. The report does not attempt to assess how 
2 Although programmes may have a number of operational and intermediate 
objectives, the ultimate objective of all DWP Active Labour Market Programmes 
is movement into work.
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in the absence of comparing the CBF CBAs with independent CBAs of the same 
programmes that have not been subject to similar time and resource constraints. 
Thus far, very few such analyses exist. It is clear that the CBAs that are being 
conducted with the CBF guidance are improving over time. The purpose of this 
report is to contribute to this improvement.
.. A cost-benefit accounting framework
Most of the CBAs conducted under the CBF guidance are of programmes involving 
some combination of counselling, training, job placement, and subsidised 
employment. In this report, we refer to these programmes as ‘employment and 
training programmes’, although they are also often called ‘welfare-to-work’ 
programmes. 
The basic CBA accounting framework that is used today in conducting most CBAs 
of employment and training programmes, was originally developed during the late 
1960s and refined in the early 1980s. A stylised version of this framework appears 
in Table 1.1. Although details concerning the specifics of the framework must vary 
somewhat from one programme to another, depending upon the specific nature 
of the services provided, the table lists those benefit and cost components that 
are typically measured.
Table .  Stylised CBF of employment and training programmes
 Society Participant Taxpayer or  
   Government 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 (B + C)
Output produced by participants
Gross earnings + + 0
Fringe benefits + + 0
Participant work-related expenditures
Tax payments 0 - +
Expenditures on child care, transportation, etc. - - 0
Use of transfer programmes by participants
Benefit payments 0 - + 
Program operating costs + 0 +
Use of support programmes by participants
Support services received by participants - 0 -
Allowances received by participants 0 + -
Support programme operating costs - 0 -
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anticipated sources of costs from different perspectives. The first column (A) shows 
aggregate benefits and costs from the perspective of society or the economy as 
a whole. The remaining columns show the distribution of benefits and costs to 
the two groups that are typically relevant in assessing employment and training 
programmes: participants or clients served by the demonstration program (B); and 
taxpayers who pay for the programme (C). This last perspective is identical to that 
of the government and is sometimes called the ‘fiscal perspective’.
Benefits and costs that accrue to society are simply the algebraic sum of benefits 
and costs to participants and to taxpayers because society is the sum of these two 
groups. Hence, the table implies that if a programme causes benefit payments 
received by participants to decline, this should be regarded as a savings or benefit 
to taxpayers (or the Government), a cost to programme participants (albeit one 
that may be offset by earnings), and neither a benefit nor a cost to society as 
a whole but simply income transferred from one segment of the population to 
another. Costs to one group that are exactly offset by benefits to another group 
are often referred to as ‘transfers’ in CBAs.
The approach represented in Table 1.1 is consistent with the standard one used in 
CBA. In standard CBAs ‘a pound is a pound’, no matter to whom it accrues. Thus, 
in Table 1.1, a pound gained or lost by an employment and training programme 
participant is treated identically to a pound gained or lost by a taxpayer or to 
the Government. Consequently, if a programme caused the benefit payments 
received by participants to fall, this would be viewed as not affecting society or 
the economy as a whole because the loss to participants would be fully offset by 
benefits to non-participants in the form of reductions in Government budgetary 
outlays.
Typically, however, employment and training programme participants have much 
lower incomes, on average, than taxpayers. As discussed later in this report, a case 
can sometimes be made for treating the gains and losses of low-income people 
differently than those of higher-income people. This is almost never done in CBAs 
of employment and training programmes, however. Instead, as can be seen in 
Table 1.1, they simply lay out the results so that the distributional consequences 
of a particular programme can be observed.
Table 1.1 divides the benefits and costs associated with employment and training 
programmes into four major categories: The first two of these categories pertain 
to effects that result if a programme increases the work effort or productivity of 
participants – for example, by helping participants find private-sector employment 
through job search assistance. On the one hand, the value of the output they 
produce will rise, which should be reflected by increases in earnings and fringe 
benefits. On the other hand, if hours at work rise, expenditures on child care 
and transportation will also increase. And if earnings rise, tax payments will also 
increase. The third major cost-benefit category in Table 1.1 pertains to decreases in 
dependency on benefit payments that may result from an employment and training 
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payments distributed under benefit programmes and the cost of administering 
these programmes to fall. The fourth major category refers to expenditures on 
support services for programme participants. These expenditures include the 
operating costs of the programme being subjected to a CBA, as well as other 
costs that result from programme activities – for example, training at external 
organisations that is taken on the recommendation of programme advisers and 
allowances to cover child care expenses. 
Three of the subcategories listed in Table 1.1 pertain to job-related expenditures 
and require clarification: participant expenditures on childcare, transportation, 
and so forth; support services received by participants; and allowances received by 
participants. The first of these subcategories refers to total job-required outlays by 
programme participants on such items as childcare, transportation, and uniforms. 
The sub-category of support services pertains to the direct provision of such goods 
by a Government agency, and the allowances sub-category refers to Government 
reimbursement of job-required expenditures by participants. Table 1.1 reflects the 
philosophy that all programme-induced increases in job-required expenditures 
should be treated identically: as resource costs to society engendered in producing 
goods and services. Of course, to the extent the Government directly provides 
support services to participants, client outlays for this purpose will be smaller. In a 
CBA, this would be reflected by a smaller expenditure amount appearing under the 
participant expenditures on job-related outlays and a larger expenditure amount 
appearing under the subcategory of support services received by participants. 
Benefits and costs that are sometimes referred to as intangible effects but are 
rarely, if ever, actually estimated in evaluations of employment and training 
programmes do not appear in Table 1.1. Examples of intangible effects include 
the values of leisure foregone and satisfaction gained from the substitution of 
work for benefit payments. Almost by definition, such impacts are very difficult 
to measure. Somewhat more tangible, but also difficult to measure benefits of 
employment and training programmes, such as programme effects on health and 
crime, are also not included in the table. Later in the report, we discuss how these 
various difficult to measure effects might be treated in CBF CBAs.
1.2 Research methods 
As part of our critical review of the CBF guidance, we examined all the pertinent 
written DWP documents provided to us by the project manager. These included 
the draft CBF guidance itself, the 2004/05 CBAs produced using the framework, 
2005/06 CBA results that were available at the time this report was being written 
(March 2007), internal CBF guidance review documents and available league 
tables. The review examined the internal CBAs and assessed how improvements 
could be made to these in the short term. In addition, the general cost-benefit 
literature was examined on specific points that arose from the review of DWP 
documents. In particular, the review attempted to address the issue of how to 
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improve the consistency of the evaluation evidence base for programmes to 
increase comparability across the CBAs. 
A number of interviews with DWP analysts who are involved with the CBF cost-
benefit studies were conducted to inform the review further. These interviews 
took place over two days and were used to discuss and identify any generic 
issues that those interviewed found in implementing the CBF guidance, as well 
as recent proposed changes to it. They also helped us learn more about the 
procedures followed in conducting previous CBF CBAs. The DWP project manager 
suggested who should be interviewed, assisted in arranging the interviews and 
provided other relevant information. A set of pre-specified questions was used to 
establish consistency in the information gathered. These questions are shown in 
Appendix A. This exercise allowed us to obtain additional details concerning the 
CBAs previously carried out at DWP and helped establish an opinion base regarding 
the feasibility of improving the evidence for different programmes.
1.3 The report structure
The report sets out a number of key issues. The issues arising in estimating the 
additional earnings resulting from the implemented programmes are dealt with 
in Chapter 2. This is followed by an exploration of how to treat other programme 
benefits in Chapter 3. Estimating the additional costs from programmes is 
covered in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of other issues that 
arise in constructing CBAs under the CBF. The report concludes with the set of 
recommendations arising from the review.
Introduction and background
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2 Issues in estimating  
 additional earnings  
 resulting from  
 programmes
2.1 What is the best strategy for obtaining reliable  
 impact estimates?
Reliable impact estimates form a key component in measuring the benefits from 
a programme. If the benefits of the programme are not to be overestimated, net 
impacts must be used rather than gross impacts. While gross impacts measure 
such outcomes as the earnings and benefit payments received by participants 
in employment and training programmes, net impacts provide estimates of the 
earnings increases and benefit payment reductions that result from participating 
in the programmes. See Section 3.1 for a discussion of the minimum impacts 
required for a meaningful CBA. 
Most DWP employment programmes provide a variety of services that aim to 
improve the employment, hours or earnings of benefit recipient groups. Thus, an 
estimate of the net impact of a programme on employment or earnings is essential 
in conducting CBAs. Net impact estimation requires that differences in outcomes 
be measured – for example, employment with a programme and employment 
without the programme. The specific way in which the comparison is made to 
estimate an impact is the evaluation design. 
There are a number of alternative evaluation designs, some of which provide better 
estimates than others. A basic set of alternative designs are described below in 
order of general design validity.
The most ideal design is an experimental one in which there is random allocation 
to either a programme participation group or a control group that does not receive 
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programme services. Random assignment helps ensure that the two groups can be 
directly compared in terms of various outcomes, such as earnings or employment, 
with any differences in these outcomes attributable to the programme. An 
important aspect of this experimental design is to ensure that baseline information 
is collected from the time of random assignment or before. In addition, follow-up 
information must be collected after random assignment. This allows evaluators 
to compare differences between the programme and control groups, both before 
and after the programme. It is also possible to compare outcomes only after the 
programme if baseline data was not collected. However, this does not allow for 
systematic differences between the programme and control groups that may exist 
even after random assignment3. It, therefore, relies heavily on random assignment 
to produce similar groups. If differences between the two groups arise from chance 
variation or a failure to implement random assignment properly, then the impact 
estimates that are produced will have lower validity4. 
Valid impact estimates can sometimes be produced with a non-experimental 
design that mimics the experiment described above. Such a design would involve 
comparing outcomes for a programme group with the same outcomes for 
a suitable comparison group5 that does not experience the programme being 
evaluated. Ideally, both baseline and follow-up data on outcomes would be 
available. The baseline data help in statistically controlling for differences between 
the programme and comparison group that existed before the programme group 
entered the programme. However, the lack of random assignment means that 
it is difficult to properly deal with differences between the groups that may be 
unmeasurable (this is termed ‘selection bias‘ in the evaluation literature) even with 
statistical adjustments. As in the case of an experimental design, in the absence 
of baseline data, it is possible to compare outcomes for only the post-programme 
period. However, the lack of baseline data means that any pre-existing systematic 
3 Baseline data allows control for systematic differences between participants 
and non-participants that are observable and which existed before 
participation and are stable over time and remain so after participation. They 
also allow for unobservable differences which do not vary over time. The 
value of baseline data is applicable to the experimental design and the non-
experimental design but more important for the latter.
4 Note also that tests of the usefulness of the baseline data are important and 
usually check that the difference between the programme and comparison 
group is stable over time for some period before the programme, so that 
it might be inferred that the systematic difference is stable over time and 
continues into the post-programme period. If the baseline difference is not 
stable, it may not exist post-participation, which can also cause a bias in 
estimates if the baseline difference has been incorporated.
5 Determining whether a comparison group is ‘suitable’ is an important 
consideration, which involves assessing the similarity of the groups to be 
compared.
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differences between the programme and comparison group that affect the 
comparison cannot be accounted for. As a result, the estimated impacts can be 
biased. 
Finally, it is also possible to conduct a before-after assessment of outcomes for 
a group of programme participants. This can be the most problematic design 
of those considered. Without a comparison group in the analysis, there is no 
accounting for what would have happened in the absence of the programme. 
In other words, change can occur over time without the programme. However, 
this design can be reasonably valid if non-programme factors are not expected 
to affect the outcomes of interest, or, in some cases, when the time period is 
short. Note that in choosing measures of the relevant data for a period before 
the programme began, it is important to consider how equivalent the baseline 
period is to the point in the labour market business cycle and characteristics of 
the programme period – and hence, it might be less valid to consider baseline 
information that was quite historical – for example, if the programme had been 
running for a long time.
The before and after design may be the best available if a suitable comparison 
group that does not experience the programme being evaluated does not exist. 
This might occur in the case of programmes that are implemented nationally 
for all areas at the same time. However, it is sometimes possible to stagger the 
introduction of a programme in a way that allows a comparison group to be drawn 
from the areas starting later. Alternatively, the group to which the programme is 
applied might be subdivided in some way so that the programme is introduced 
later for some of the subgroups. However, the suitability of the comparison group 
that results is an important consideration in determining whether this design can 
produce valid net impact estimates6.
For a newly started programme, it is usually easier to select an evaluation design. 
But it is often difficult to develop an evaluation design that is appropriate for 
a programme that has been ongoing for a long time and that is universally 
available, and so this case is now considered. As for other cases, the most valid 
and reliable strategy is an experimental design, the first of those considered 
above. However, such a design may confront issues with legal entitlement to 
services – but where these issues are not present or when more people wish to 
participate in a programme than can be accommodated or when a programme 
is not reaching all of it’s intended population, randomisation can be justified as a 
fair means of distributing programme services. One non-experimental alternative 
6 Note that programme participation or exposure should be carefully considered 
in selecting comparison groups – for example, evaluators need to consider 
whether they had reasonable access to information about the programme, 
whether they would be able to participate in the programme if they applied 
and whether they could be assessed as eligible for the programme. These 
factors can affect the suitability of the comparison group.
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to an experimental evaluation in the case of a programme that has been ongoing 
for some time is to compare participants and non-participants, using statistical 
adjustments to control for differences between the two groups. Techniques that 
can be used for this purpose include matching, propensity score matching and 
regression analysis, such as the Heckman selection model or instrumental variables 
(see, for example, Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999, Heckman and Hotz 1989, 
and Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon 2002). 
Clearly, any evaluation designs that require pre-programme baseline measures 
(which are all the most valid designs) necessitate timely consideration – in other 
words, enough time needs to be allowed prior to the introduction of the programme 
for the evaluation baseline measures to take place. In particular this is needed if 
surveys are to be designed and used to collect measures. Administrative data that 
already exists can provide useful baseline information; however, it may be difficult 
to get the desired variables/measures that are needed for the evaluation impact 
measures, such as earnings.
2.2 Using impact estimates in a cost-benefit analysis
In an ideal CBA of employment and training programmes, the key estimates of 
net impacts (for example, programme effects on earnings and benefit payments) 
would exist for each month the impacts persist. In practice, these ideal measures 
often do not exist. As a result, in conducting CBF CBAs, it may be necessary 
to compute programme effects on benefit payments as the product of separate 
estimates of average benefit payments and the programme’s effect on the 
number of individuals leaving benefits. Similarly, it may be necessary to compute 
programme effects on earnings as follows:
(∆J)(DA)(WA) 
where ∆J is the number of additional jobs resulting from the employment and 
training programme, DA is the average duration of the additional jobs obtained by 
programme participants and WA is the average wage paid at these jobs.
A number of issues that arise from this approach are discussed in later sections 
of the report. In this section, we assume that the net impact estimates exist for 
several years after individuals enter a programme, although programme impacts 
may continue past this period. An illustration of actual time profiles for the New 
Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) appears as Figure 2.17. 
7 Figure 2.1 is taken from Greenberg and Davis (2007). NDDP covers both new 
and continuing incapacity benefit claimants who register with Job Brokers 
who administer the programme. Figure 2.1 pertains to continuing claimants 
who registered.
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Figure . Impacts on the employment of New Deal for Disabled  
  People registrants over time
Three time profiles are shown in Figure 2.1. All three profiles pertain to programme 
impacts on earnings. The shortest of the profiles was estimated for a large group of 
NDDP registrants who were followed for 24 months. The middle length profile was 
estimated for a much smaller group of NDDP registrants who were followed for 36 
months. It is obvious from these two profiles that NDDP’s impact on employment 
did not end at either 24 or 36 months, although it does appear to be beginning 
to taper off at 36 months. Thus, to estimate impacts past the 36-month point, 
it was necessary to extrapolate. This, was done by first estimating a regression 
equation in which the impact in each month was the dependent variable and the 
number of months after registration and the square of the number of months 
were used as dependent variables (for details see Greenberg and Davis 2007). 
The estimated regression equation was then used to predict future programme 
impacts on employment. These regression-predicted impacts are shown in Figure 
2.1 as the curve with grey dashes. As can be seen, the impacts were predicted to 
persist for 82 months.
Once the predicted impacts were available, the total number of additional months 
of employment for an average or typical NDDP registrant that could be attributed 
to the programme was estimated as the area under the time profile curves. In doing 
this, the 24-month curve was used for the first 24 months after registration and 
the regression-predicted curve was used for the remaining months (see Greenberg 
and Davis 2007). This estimate of NDDP’s impact on the additional months an 
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average registrant was employed as a result of NDDP, was then multiplied by an 
estimate of the average monthly take-home earnings received by NDDP registrants 
when they were employed. The resulting value provided an estimate of NDDP’s 
impact on earnings for an average registrant. 
2.3 What are the issues in estimating the number  
 of additional jobs resulting from a programme  
 when net employment impact estimates do not  
 exist for the programme?
Evidence is not always available of programme net impacts on employment. As 
this is a key figure in the CBA, in practice under the CBF guidance a substitution 
is sometimes made where an estimate is constructed based on other data. The 
substitute information was formed in various ways. For example, for the disability 
programmes substitute data were used in several cases in differing ways: firstly, 
using impacts from other programmes like NDDP, sometimes with an adjustment 
for whether, in the constructors judgement, the programme in question is 
expected, a priori to, have higher or lower additionality (although the basis for the 
judgement was not made clear). Secondly, in some cases qualitative information 
was used about whether the respondent thought they would have found work 
without the programme to formulate an additionality estimate. For New Deal 
50 plus (ND50plus) an assumption was used to define the additionality figure, 
although again, the judgement basis was not well established. 
Due to the lack of evidence, substitute information was sought in the construction 
of several CBF CBAs for good reason: to proceed with comparisons of the CBF 
CBAs of different programmes, it was necessary to be able to use some data to 
complete these CBA estimates. Thus, substitute information was sought for some 
of the CBA estimates where better evidence was not already available. However, it 
is unlikely that the validity of these estimates using such substitutes is always well 
founded, and this can undermine the CBA. The substitution of net impacts of very 
similar programmes probably has the least problems for several reasons, including 
that it substitutes a net impact estimate rather than gross, and if the programme 
is very similar then an inference that it is applicable may be reasonable8. The use 
of the qualitative evidence that tried to simulate a net impact where only post-
programme outcomes were known for a programme and comparison group has 
quite low validity because of the weakness of qualitative evidence such as non-
representative sampling (which means that statistical inference does not apply) 
8 Note that it is important to examine the programmes for similarities and 
differences and give an assessment of the validity of this substitution on the 
basis of this.
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and usually small sample sizes9. However the judgment based on assumptions 
are likely to be even lower in validity as they were formed on even less relevant 
evidence. The important aspect for improving validity of substitute information 
is the use of evidence, and examining, assessing and reporting the value and 
relevance of the substitute evidence. Statistically valid, quantitative estimates of 
the net impacts of the programme are the recommended ideal against which the 
validity is compared. 
The impact estimate on employment is critical for the additional jobs estimate, 
and hence, the issues overlap with those discussed in Section 2.4. One issue is 
the low validity of these substitute estimates. Secondly, there is the resultant 
variation across evaluations that the use of these substitutions introduces when 
other CBAs use valid net impacts of employment in their construction. Thirdly, 
documentation on the formulation of estimates, giving data sources and reasoning 
for judgements was usually lacking. This undermines the CBA quality as without 
this documentation the CBA validity cannot be assessed, or validated. Finally, the 
implications of the lack of data, subsequent substitutions and their validity for 
the CBA need to be discussed in reporting the CBA findings. However, often they 
were not. 
The constructions and approaches used for substitute evidence were mostly 
informative where they did attempt to seek out useful evidence to use where 
the evaluation information for a programme was lacking. Where the key impact 
measures are missing, the weak nature of the evidence base can be improved by 
increasing the amount of sensitivity analysis for the substituted information, so 
that the implications are better explored10.
The employment impact estimate is very important, particularly with DWP CBAs, 
where usually earnings estimates are not directly available (see Section 3.1). 
Incorporating evidence of this impact as a requirement for a programme’s evaluation 
where at all possible would improve CBA construction. Smaller programmes could 
rely on administrative data to produce this, using evaluation designs as discussed 
in Section 2.1, with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) data on jobs and earnings 
and DWP data on benefits used to estimate the impacts. It would be helpful 
to improve the evidence base on which the CBAs are based, by ensuring, well 
in advance that the minimum impacts are available for the CBA (as set out in 
Section 3.1). However, where substitutions are made, better documentation and 
discussion of the implications is needed, together with sensitivity analysis. Note, 
9 Qualitative evidence can also refer to subjective assessments from surveys, 
for example answers about the proportion who thought the programme 
helped them to get into a job. The validity of subjective evidence is also quite 
low, and strong caveats need to be added.
10 It is possible that an average outcome of a reasonable number of sensitivity 
analyses could be used to produce a substitute that considered a number of 
reasonable scenarios.
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however, that increasing the amount of sensitivity analysis does not improve the 
evidence base – it just gives a better understanding of how the results would be 
affected if alternative assumptions were made and that these alternatives cannot 
be discounted because of uncertainty about what the assumptions should be. This 
is particularly important where substitute information has been used. 
2.4 What issues arise in converting impacts on  
 employment into additional jobs? 
As indicated in Section 2.3, estimates of programme impacts on employment are 
not always available. When they are available, an approach that has sometimes 
been used in conducting CBAs with the CBF guidance involves converting the 
estimates of impacts on employment into the number of additional jobs resulting 
from a programme. This approach relies on the following formula:
∆J = J(∆%E ∕ %E)
Where:
 ∆J = Number of additional jobs resulting from the programme 
 J = Number of programme participants who obtained employment
 ∆%E = Estimated programme impact on employment
 %E = Percentage of the programme group in employment
The number of programme participants who are employed, J, is available from 
programme administrative records. The percentage of programme group members 
who are employed, %E, and the estimated programme impact on employment, 
∆%E, are available from impact analyses. The latter is usually reported as the 
percentage point increase in employment attributable to the programme. 
The formula multiplies an impact estimate by the number of job entries and then 
divides the resulting value by the percentage of the programme group that is 
employed. This last step is essential because without it the number of additional 
jobs resulting from a programme would be understated. Thus, if 3,000 participants 
in a particular programme obtained jobs, and the impact study found that of 
the 30 per cent of the programme group in the sample who were employed, 
one-third (ten percentage points) would not have been employed in the absence 
of the programme, 1,000 of the 3,000 jobs would be estimated to have resulted 
from the programme (3,000 x (10/30).
This formulation is perfectly reasonable, but inconsistencies result in using it 
because most impact analyses produce impact estimates for a given cohort of 
programme participants over multiple time periods – for example, for each of 
several months or several years – and the size of the impact estimates change 
over time. More specifically, impacts for a given cohort are typically found to first 
increase and then decline. Thus, the time profile appears to resemble an inverted 
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U11. As a consequence, an impact estimate for a particular time period must be 
selected. Alternatively, impact estimates could be averaged over several time 
periods. The value of %E would, of course, be selected for the same time period 
or periods.
We recommend using the largest of the estimated impacts, regardless of the 
time period in which it occurs, and the value of %E for the same time period. 
More programme participants will be working as a result of the programme 
during this time period than during any other period. For example, Figure 2.1 
implies that the peak employment impact for NDDP occurred about 35 months 
after registration and was just in excess of .12, suggesting that at the peak the 
employment level of registrants was a little over 12 percentage points higher than 
it would have been in the absence of the programme. Use of this ’peak impact‘ 
value would produce the correct estimate of the additional jobs resulting from 
11 For example, a meta-analysis that included 27 random assignment evaluations 
of over 70 US mandatory welfare-to-work programmes targeted at recipients 
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which was previously the 
US’s major cash welfare programme, found that programme impacts on 
employment first increased but began to decline after two or three years 
and ended after five to seven years (Greenberg, Cebulla, and Bouchet 
2005). An earlier meta-analysis by some of the same researchers obtained 
very similar results for impacts on earnings (Greenberg et	al. 2004), as did a 
meta-analysis of US government-funded training programmes (Greenberg, 
Michalopoulous, and Robins 2004). The findings in the Greenberg, Cebulla, 
and Bouchet study are especially supportive of the existence of an inverse 
U-shaped time pattern because a number of the evaluations included in their 
meta-analysis measured impacts for three, four, or even five years. The one 
exception to the inverse U-shaped time-trend pattern was for adult women 
in the Greenberg, Michalopoulous, and Robins (2004) study. They found that 
earnings impacts for adult women who participated in training programmes 
first increased for several years and then remain undiminished. However, 
earnings impacts for the other two groups they analysed, adult males and 
youth, did seem to follow the pattern. Moreover, except for adult women 
in the Greenberg, Michalopoulous, and Robins (2004) study, the impact 
peak and end of the impacts occurred at roughly the same points in time 
in all three studies. Of course, these meta-analyses pertain to the ‘average’ 
programme in the sample of all those examined. Individual programmes 
may have somewhat different patterns. For example, Knight et	al. (2006) 
found that the impacts of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) remained 
substantial after four years, although they had begun to diminish slightly by 
that time. Dolton and O’Neill (2002) found that Restart still had substantial 
impacts on the unemployment rates of males (but not females) five years 
after initial participation in the programme, although there is again some 
indication that they had begin to diminish by that time.
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the programme if each individual who took a job as result of the programme, 
kept that job until the peak impact occurred, or longer. In practice of course, 
participants will leave jobs during each time period and other participants will 
find jobs during the same period. Thus, the latter replace the former. To the 
extent such ‘churning’ takes place, use of the largest impact estimate will result in 
understating the total number of additional jobs resulting from the programme, 
but by less than using an impact estimate from another time period or using the 
average values of several estimates. It is also possible that programme impacts still 
appear to be increasing when the impact analysis ends. If the rate of increase has 
begun to diminish, however, it should be possible to determine the approximate 
value of the peak impact by using the available impact estimates as the dependent 
variable in a regression equation and a quadratic specification of the time period 
corresponding to each impact estimate (i.e. the number of months since entering 
the programme and the number of months squared) as independent variables12.
2.5 Can estimates of impacts on being off out-of-work  
 benefits be used to estimate employment entry?
In some cases, programme impacts on employment have not been estimated, 
but programme impacts on being off benefits have been. If it can be assumed 
in such instances that all programme participants who exit from their current 
benefit programme as a result of the employment and training programme being 
analysed enter jobs, the number of additional jobs can be accurately estimated by 
modifying the formula presented in the previous section as follows:
∆J = J(∆%L ∕ %L)
Where:
 ∆J = Number of additional jobs resulting from the programme 
 J = Number of programme participants who obtained employment
 L = Estimated programme impact on being off benefits
 %L = Percentage of the programme group leaving their current benefit 
 programme
This formula is obviously identical to the one in the previous section, except that 
∆%L is used as a proxy for ∆E. The obvious problem with using the formula is that 
the assumption upon which it is based is invalid; some individuals who leave a 
benefit programme do not enter employment. To suggest just a few possibilities, 
12 If the rate of increase has not begun to diminish, then it may be that the 
time period considered is too short. Without further evidence on the impact 
over time, it is a matter of judgement as to when the peak impact might 
occur.
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they may enter another benefit programme, leave the country, or die. In addition, 
some people may no longer qualify for benefits as a result of marriage in the case 
of lone parents or for health improvements in the case of disabled people and 
people with health problems. If some individuals who leave a benefit programme 
as a result of an employment and training programme do not enter employment, 
then ∆L will exceed ∆E and the estimate of ∆J will be too large.
If the percentage of those who leave their current benefit programme to enter 
employment is known, the estimate of ∆L can then be multiplied by this figure 
and used in the formula that appears above to provide a corrected estimate of the 
number of additional jobs. Data on the destination of those who have left several 
different benefit programmes suggest that around 60 per cent enter employment. 
It is important to recognise, however, that the percentage entering employment is 
probably higher for those who leave benefits as a result of an employment and 
training programme, although exactly how much higher is unlikely to be known. 
If it is higher, the ‘adjusted’ estimate of ∆L would be too small. 
Even when programme impacts on employment have been estimated, it is still 
useful to use estimates of programme impacts on being off benefits to produce 
an alternative estimate of the number of additional jobs. The reason is that both 
the survey data and HMRC data that have been used to estimate employment 
impacts miss employment spells and, as a consequence, understate impacts on 
employment. This is especially true of the latter. For example, workers with earnings 
that are below the taxable threshold or who are self-employed are not recorded in 
the HMRC data as having a job. Thus, additional jobs that are determined on the 
basis of employment impacts estimates will tend to be understated. On the other 
hand, if additional jobs are determined on the basis of estimates of programme 
impacts on being off benefits and these estimates are not corrected for the fact 
that some of those leaving benefits do not enter jobs, the resulting estimate of 
additional jobs will tend to be overstated. Thus, the alternative estimates will 
bracket the true number of additional jobs resulting from a programme and are, 
therefore, useful for sensitivity tests.
2.6 Given an estimate of additional jobs, how should  
 job duration be estimated?
Programme benefits from each additional job depend, importantly, on the earnings 
received by those who take the jobs. This, in turn, partially depends on the number 
of additional months of employment that result from the programme being 
subjected to a CBA. As discussed in Section 2.2, it is sometimes possible to directly 
estimate the additional months of employment that result from a programme as 
the area under a time profile curve of programme impacts on employment. When 
it is not possible to do this, additional months of employment can be computed as 
the product of the number of additional jobs that result from the programme and 
the length of time an average person who obtains one of these jobs continues to 
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be employed13. Thus, job duration is a key variable in estimating the benefits of 
some of the programmes for which CBF CBAs are conducted.
For those programmes for which existing estimates of job duration have not been 
available, CBF cost-benefit studies have been based on a uniform assumption 
– that each additional job lasts for one year. This, of course, eliminates differences 
in job duration as a source of variation in net benefits across programmes. Ideally, 
the net benefit estimates should reflect this variation. Thus, efforts should be 
made to determine job duration for more programmes. 
A straightforward approach to obtaining an estimate of job duration is to use 
existing survey data to determine how long different programme target groups 
typically remain in jobs once they acquire them. Some data sources might be 
previous specific evaluation surveys of the target group, the destinations survey 
(although this survey follows individuals for only four to six months after they leave 
benefits), or more general surveys such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (although 
it is sometimes difficult to identify the appropriate benefit claimant group in these 
surveys14). For example, separate estimates could be obtained for disabled people 
and people with health problems, lone parents, younger workers, older workers, 
and the long-term unemployed. It would be even better if these estimates pertain 
to the first job after leaving benefits. A major drawback of this approach is that the 
estimates would pertain to all the members of each target group, not just those 
individuals who acquired jobs as a result of participating in a specific employment 
and training programme. Moreover, only one estimate would be available for each 
target group. Thus, comparisons of the net benefits for two programmes that 
treat the same target group would not reflect the possibility that one programme 
may place its participants in longer duration jobs than the other. Still, as well they 
should, comparisons among programmes targeting different population groups 
(e.g. lone parents versus young workers) would reflect the fact that members of 
some groups tend to keep their jobs longer than members of other groups.
A second approach begins by summing estimates of programme impact on 
employment across the time periods during which there is an impact (see Section 
2.2). This will provide an estimate of the number of additional months a typical 
participant works as a result of an employment and training programme. Note 
that those participants who do not work at all as a result of a programme, and, 
thus, have zero values for each time period are included in this average. To take 
13 Note that although they may continue to be employed, they may not 
necessarily remain in the job they initially entered.
14 For example, these surveys do not allow direct identification of the programme 
group, and so indirect measures can be constructed from them. However, it 
can be difficult to identify the specific programme target group, for example, 
for New Deal for 25 plus (ND25plus) one needs to be able to identify not 
only the unemployed but Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants, and also 
the length of claim for the target entry group.
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account of this in determining the job duration of those who do work as a 
result of the programme, the impact estimates for each time period should be 
divided by the percentage of the programme group that is working during the 
time period prior to summing them. Also note that the procedure just outlined 
provides an estimate of the number of additional months worked as a result of 
the programme. This estimate will differ from months actually worked for those 
individuals who would have worked some months even in the absence of the 
programme. However, additional months worked as a result of a programme is 
probably the most appropriate figure for most purposes.
Job duration can obviously only be computed in this manner for those programmes 
for which the required employment impact estimates are available. However, the 
duration estimates for the programmes for which they are available could be 
assigned to programmes for which they are not available that targets a similar 
population. For example, if duration estimates are available for a programme that 
targets disabled people and people with health problems (e.g. the NDDP), they 
could be used for other programmes that also target the disabled and people 
with health problems (e.g. Access to Work or Reemploy). As in the case of using 
survey data to estimate job duration for different programme target groups, 
doing this would not take account of the possibility that one programme places 
its participants in longer duration jobs than another, even though they target 
members of the same group; but it would allow for the fact that different target 
populations are likely to stay in jobs for different lengths of time.
2.7 How are earnings best estimated when programme  
 impacts on earnings are not available? Is it  
 reasonable to assume the hourly wage corresponds  
 to the minimum wage?
Sometimes earnings estimates are to be substituted because the programme 
impacts on earnings are not available. 
If possible the most appropriate substitute is survey information that has been 
collected on the programme, and the best measure is the average earnings of 
those who enter work after the programme. A similar alternative measure would 
be administrative data of earnings of those who enter work after the programme. 
This helps give a measure that is for the most similar group. However, it is not 
as valid to use this as the programme impacts on earnings because this measure 
does not necessarily reflect the earnings of those who respond to the programme. 
Instead, this measure reflects simply all those who enter work, and is hence, 
possibly an overestimate or underestimate depending on whether the average 
earnings of those who respond to the programme are higher or lower than the 
average of all those who enter work after the programme. If there is not much 
variation in the distribution of earnings of all those who enter work after the 
programme, then this issue can be reduced. If the survey was collected some time 
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ago, then updating by using the annual increase in the average earnings figures 
produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) can help make the data more 
representative of the current year. 
If no programme survey information is available, then conduct a search for 
substitute information from a survey that contains earnings, with coverage of a 
group that is as similar as possible to the programme group – for example, a survey 
of a group that exits benefits would be more useful than a survey of the general 
population; a survey with coverage of a group that exits the same benefit as the 
programme group is even more useful. It is also possible that the average job for 
those entering work after the programme is described in terms of occupation, 
industry, supervisory level and other information that might help match a suitable 
earnings distribution from other published sources. 
Sometimes there might be no relevant survey earnings to substitute, and the legal 
minimum wage might be substituted. This should only be considered when all 
viable alternatives have been exhausted. It is unlikely to be correct that 100 per cent 
of those entering work after the programme receive the minimum wage, instead 
this is the floor above which the distribution of wages occurs and so the average 
will lie somewhere above the minimum wage. This measure also suffers the same 
problem in that it does not reflect those who respond to the programme. For a 
substitute based on the minimum wage, one should use whatever evidence can 
be found to determine the likely distribution above the minimum wage that can 
be attributed to this programme group, and then add a mark-up to the minimum 
wage to reflect this. 
In writing the CBA, a description should be made of the selection process by which 
the earnings estimates are chosen to be substituted in for the earnings impacts, 
explaining what alternatives were considered and why this is deemed the best 
alternative. This allows the validity of this substitution to be assessed. Sensitivity 
analysis of the substituted values would help explore the importance to the CBA 
of the weakness of the evidence used. 
It would be a useful requirement for evaluation designs for a programme that they 
estimate an earnings impact together with the employment impact and benefit 
impact (also see Section 2.1). This would facilitate construction of the CBA.
Issues in estimating additional earnings resulting from programmes

3 How to treat other  
 programme benefits
3.1 Which impacts need to be estimated at a minimum  
 for a meaningful cost-benefit analysis?
At a minimum, CBAs of employment and training programmes require estimates 
of programme impacts on earnings and benefit programme receipts15. Earlier, we 
discussed various ways in which these estimates might be obtained. Programme 
operating costs and payments of financial incentives and allowances to programme 
participants also need to be known. 
Once estimates of programme impacts on earnings and transfer payments are 
obtained, they can be combined with other information to derive a number 
of additional impacts – for example, programme effects on tax payments and 
receipts, National Insurance (NI) contributions, housing and Council Tax benefits, 
tax credits, childcare cost, commuter travel cost, and deadweight loss from taxes16. 
This leaves out a number of potential programme impacts such as those on health 
and crime, but, as discussed in the following section, CBAs can be, and typically 
are, conducted without obtaining estimates of these impacts. The implications 
of leaving certain impacts out of the analyses need to be explicitly discussed in 
presenting findings, however.
15 ‘Benefit programme receipts’ includes both the benefits individuals are 
receiving when they enter an employment and training programme and the 
benefits they receive after leaving the programme. For example, a disabled 
person may be receiving incapacity benefits upon entering NDDP, then take 
a job, and finally lose the job and receive JSA. Housing Benefit and Council 
Tax Benefit (CTB) are not included here, but are discussed in the following 
paragraph.
16 Deadweight loss that results from distortions to economic incentives that are 
caused by taxes is discussed in Section 4.4.
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While the CBF CBAs require estimates of programme impacts on earnings and 
transfer payments, and estimates of programme operating costs and payments of 
financial incentives and allowances to programme participants, these estimates are 
better for some programmes than for others. The earnings impacts, in particular, 
are sometimes derived from estimates of programme impacts on employment or 
being off benefits and other times from just educated guesses about the additional 
jobs resulting from different programmes. Estimates of impacts on employment 
and being off benefits are obviously vastly superior to guesses about numbers of 
additional jobs, but are nonetheless still typically subject to serious methodological 
and data limitations. And these are more serious in some instances than in 
others. 
In the case of some programmes, the earnings impacts that are derived are limited 
in three additional respects: First, earnings impacts that are derived from estimates 
of programme impacts on employment or from estimates of the number of 
additional jobs that result from a programme, will not incorporate the possibility 
that some programme participants who would have worked even in the absence 
of the programme, increase their weekly hours as a result of the programme. Such 
increases are especially likely in the case of the NDDP, which conditions the size of 
the incentive fees paid to Job Brokers to the number of weekly hours their employed 
customers work. Second, earnings impacts that are derived from estimates of 
programme impacts on employment or from estimates of the additional jobs that 
result from a programme, will not incorporate the possibility that hourly wage 
rates increased as a result of the programme. Third, there are a few employment 
programmes that place individuals into subsidised jobs (e.g. Reemploy) or into 
jobs in which individuals temporarily work for no wage (e.g. Access to Work). In 
principle, the market value of the output that is produced in these jobs should be 
counted as a benefit in the CBA of these programmes, although, in practice, it is 
difficult to value this benefit. 
3.2 To what extent does ignoring hard to estimate and  
 monetising benefits such as health, crime, and  
 impacts on children distort cross-programme  
 comparisons? How should these effects be treated  
 in Cost Benefit Framework cost-benefit analyses?
There are a number of (potential) programme benefits that are not valued in CBAs 
conducted under the CBF guidance. Important examples include the value of 
possible programme impacts on health, crime, the welfare of children, self-esteem 
and happiness. The reason they are not valued in analyses is that the information 
necessary to do so seldom exists. The sizes of the impacts on these outcomes are 
rarely measured and, even when they are, it is often difficult to place a monetary 
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value on them.17 Indeed, for the same reasons, these benefits are rarely valued in 
any CBAs of programmes that train participants and/or help place them in jobs. 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss how several of these unmeasured 
benefits might be treated in CBF CBAs. 
Two DWP memos have recently been written that provide some estimates that 
could be used to value improvements in health and reductions in crime and drug 
abuse that result from programme-induced increases in employment. However, 
both memos stress that existing evidence is inconclusive about the size of these 
effects or, indeed, even about whether causal links between employment and 
health, or employment and crime and drug abuse actually exist. Thus, we do not 
recommend using the estimates reported in the memos to place monetary values 
on improvements in health and reductions in crime and drug abuse that might 
result from programme-induced increases in employment. Doing so is at least as 
likely to distort the analysis as contribute to it.
If programme impacts on health, crime and drug abuse are not valued, it becomes 
important in reporting league tables of the CBF cost-benefit findings to point 
out that the comparison of programmes may be somewhat misleading unless 
readers consider these effects, even though this can only be done somewhat 
speculatively. For example, it can be pointed out that if a causal link does exist 
between employment and health, programmes that are targeted at the disabled 
and people with health problems are more likely to result in health improvements 
for a given increase in employment than programmes that are targeted at other 
groups. Similarly, it can also be pointed out that programmes targeted at youth 
or at the long-term unemployed will probably have a greater effect in reducing 
crime and drug abuse than programmes targeted at lone parents, older people, 
and the disabled, given the same increase in employment, but only if increases in 
employment really do cause crime and drug misuse to fall.
Over time, it should be possible to establish whether some of the employment 
and training programmes that are subjected to CBF CBAs result in improvements 
in health by estimating the impacts of these programmes on health status18. This 
would require that survey information on health outcomes be collected for both 
a programme group and a comparison group. Similar survey information could 
be collected on measures of self-esteem and happiness to examine programme 
impacts on these outcomes. However, collecting sufficiently accurate survey data 
on crime and drug use so that programme impacts on these outcomes can also 
be estimated seems highly problematic. For obvious reasons, survey respondents 
are reluctant to admit to such behaviours. Police crime records on programme and 
comparison group members could possibly be gathered instead, but such studies 
17 This is less true of health and crime than of the other outcomes mentioned 
above (for example, see Boardman et	al., Chapter 15).
18 Impacts on health have been estimated as part of the Pathways to Work 
evaluation (see Bewley, Dorsett and Haile 2007).
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would probably be labour-intensive and expensive (see also Chapter 8, MDRC 
1980).19
Several recent studies have used a random assignment evaluation design to 
estimate the impacts on child welfare of US welfare-to-work programmes for 
lone parents. In general, these effects appear to be small and mixed. That is, it 
is not clear whether these programmes improve child welfare or tend to operate 
in the opposite direction. However, one recent review has concluded that there 
is fairly strong evidence that recent mandatory work-related activities have 
reduced student achievement among adolescents (Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman 
2002), while another synthesis concludes that welfare-to-work programmes with 
financial incentives have had small positive effects on children in elementary 
school, but other programme features had little effect on young children (Morris 
et	al. 2001). Until impact findings become available for UK programmes, or at 
least clearer findings become available for US programmes, it is probably best that 
reports of CBF CBAs do little more than mention that employment and training 
programmes may affect the children of lone parents, but even the direction of 
impact is unclear.
3.3 Should using a micro-simulation model to obtain  
 some impacts (e.g. Working Tax Credit, Council  
 Tax Benefit, tax payments, employer and worker  
 National Insurance contributions, etc.) and to treat  
 take-up be considered?
It would be simpler and produce better estimates that account for dynamics and 
characteristics if a micro-simulation model was used for these impact estimates. A 
model such as the TAXBEN model of the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) can facilitate 
this. The advantage of these types of models is that they examine the changes for 
individuals rather than looking at averages. A tax and benefit model is a computer 
programme that calculates the effects of possible changes in the fiscal system on a 
sample of households. By using a sample which is representative of the population, 
such models allow users to make accurate inferences about the aggregate revenue 
19 A number of years ago, police records were obtained for members of 
programme and control groups that were sampled as part of a random 
assignment evaluation of an employment programme demonstration 
(Kemper, Long, and Thornton 1981). The intent was to value the programme’s 
impact on crime for two programme target groups: recovering drug addicts 
and ex-convicts. The programme was found to have appreciably reduced 
crime among the first group but to have substantially increased it among 
the second, suggesting, perhaps, that the study’s methodology might be 
flawed.
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implications of specific changes, and to examine the distributional effects of policy 
on different sub-groups of the population. TAXBEN operates on data taken from 
the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), a yearly representative sample of 7,000 UK 
households. It currently also allows modelling of individual’s budget constraints 
and replacement rates (see Giles and Macrae 1995). In the absence of this, the 
methods currently used for CBAs under the CBF guidance are, however, adequate 
where they use the tax tables. In considering take-up, many CBF CBAs have 
previously assumed that take-up of these other benefits is total at 100 per cent. 
It would be better to take a more realistic account of take-up, which is unlikely 
to reach 100 per cent. A micro-simulation model could assist with this. The use 
of further analytical evidence on actual take-up rates is also useful, which is the 
approach DWP is adopting in its 2005/06 update. 
3.4 How should savings in administering benefit  
 programmes be estimated?
Because employment and training programmes may reduce participation in income 
transfer programmes such as JSA, Incapacity benefits and Income Support (IS), 
they may also reduce the cost of administrating these programmes. In principle, 
these savings should be included in conducting CBF CBAs, although this is not 
done currently.
DWP has estimates of the annual costs of administering various income transfer 
programmes – for example, the annual cost of administering IS is estimated to be 
about £40 per recipient and the annual cost of administering Incapacity benefits 
is estimated to be about £25 per recipient. If estimates of programme impacts 
on months or years off benefits also exist, the savings in administering income 
transfer programmes is readily computed as the product of administrative costs 
and programme impact on time off benefits. 
Estimates of savings in administering income transfer programmes were made in 
this way in a recent CBA of the NDDP (Greenberg and Davis 2007). Because the 
annual costs of administering income transfer programmes are apparently quite 
small, the estimated savings were also relatively small (in the order of £20 or £30 
per programme registrant). Thus, whether estimates of these savings are included 
in the CBF CBAs is unlikely to be very important.
3.5 Is the use of the product market corrector  
 recommended by the Cost Benefit Framework  
 guidance appropriate?
Because of the existence of monopoly power in the economy, some workers who 
enter employment as a result of employment and training programmes are paid 
less than the value of the output they produce. More specifically, some workers 
generate monopoly rents that accrue to the owners of the firms for whom they 
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go to work because the value of their marginal product exceeds their marginal 
revenue product and, hence, their wage rate. Thus, estimates of programme 
impacts on earnings understate programme benefits. To correct for this, the CBF 
document recommends that estimates of programme impacts on earnings be 
multiplied by a ‘product market corrector’ that equals 1.26 (DWP 2006). This 
value was computed by taking the reciprocal of labour’s share of factor income 
(which is about 0.8). 
Although it is undoubtedly true that employment and training programmes 
engender monopoly rents as a result of increasing employment, some of these 
rents are received by the foreign owners of UK firms. While the monopoly rents 
that accrue to UK citizens should, in principle, be counted as benefits from 
employment and training programmes, those that are received by non-citizens 
typically are not counted in CBAs of social programmes.
More importantly, the reciprocal of labour’s share of factor income does not 
appropriately correct for monopoly in the economy. Although the 1.26 figure 
mentioned above correctly implies that for each pound of earnings in the economy, 
a total of 26 pence are returned to the other factors of production (e.g. capital, 
land and entrepreneurship), there is no reason to think that all, or even most, 
of these returns result from monopoly rents. Just like labour, capital, land and 
entrepreneurship earn returns even under perfect competition. Use of the 1.26 
figure would be appropriate if it could be assumed that the additional workers 
who are employed as a result of employment and training programmes make use 
of capital and land that would exist in the absence of the programmes but be 
underutilised or even stand idle. This assumption is tenuous, however, and even 
if it were valid, the resulting programme benefits would only partially consist of 
monopoly rents.
In summary, we do not think use of the existing product market corrector is 
appropriate. Given its purpose, it is probably much too large a value (although it 
could possibly serve as an upper bound in a sensitivity analysis). A more appropriate 
corrector would be the share of national income that consists of monopoly rents, 
and even this figure should be multiplied by the proportion of monopoly rents 
that are received by UK citizens. We asked a few cost-benefit experts if they knew 
of any studies that provided an estimate of this value, but they did not. Until an 
appropriate value can be derived, we recommend that those who conduct CBF 
CBAs point out in reporting them that estimates of earnings impacts will understate 
the total benefits resulting from employment and training programmes to the 
extent that increases in employment increase monopoly rents in the economy.
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3.6 Should a multiplier be used in computing  
 programme benefits?
It is sometimes contended that the additional earnings engendered by 
employment and training programmes will be spent to make purchases and the 
firms from whom the purchases are made will, in turn, spend their newly gained 
revenues, and this, in turn will generate still more revenues that will be spent, and 
so-forth. It is then further argued that programme impacts on earnings should be 
multiplied by a value greater than one to take account of these effects. A similar 
argument for using a multiplier can be made about revenues that are expended in 
supporting the programmes.20
A multiplier of this sort is not currently used in conducting the CBF CBAs, and we 
believe that one should not be used unless rates of unemployment are high or large 
amounts of other resources (e.g. land, buildings and machinery) are underutilised. 
Under these circumstances, increases in the demand for various products could 
potentially reduce levels of unemployment and increase the utilisation of other 
idle resources such as empty buildings, and a multiplier could be used to take 
account of this. In the absence of high levels of unemployment and idle resources, 
however, increases in spending by programme participants or expenditure incurred 
in operating employment and training programmes will put upward pressure on 
prices and cause labour and other resources to shift from one use to another. 
Increases in prices will make producers better off but consumers worse off, and 
thus, on net, do not have substantial effects on programme benefits.21
20 The effects discussed in this paragraph take place in secondary, rather than 
in primary, markets. That is, they occur in markets that are indirectly affected 
by employment and training programmes. Chapter 5 of Boardman et	 al.	
(2006) demonstrates that effects that occur in secondary markets do not 
engender net benefits of appreciable magnitude unless these markets are 
distorted and can, therefore, usually be ignored in CBAs.
21 See Boardman et	al. (2006, Chapter 5) for a detailed discussion.
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4 Issues in estimating  
 additional costs resulting  
 from programmes
4.1 Is the measure of costs currently being used  
 reasonable for comparing programmes?
Ideally in CBAs, the estimate of programme costs should measure the programme’s 
opportunity costs. In other words, the measure should be the value of the resources 
that are used to support the programme that, as a result of the programme, cannot 
be used for other purposes. For example, the staff that administer programmes 
are unavailable for other types of work. The opportunity cost of the programmes 
is the value of what they would have produced in the absence of the programmes. 
In practice, their salary is used in CBAs as an approximation of their opportunity 
cost. 
A careful cost analysis is the best means of measuring costs, starting with a list of 
the programme components and then finding suitable measures for all aspects 
of programme costs. A reasonable alternative that is used for the CBF CBAs is to 
take the total annual costs as measured by Jobcentre Plus accounts. The actual 
historical figures for costs should be used rather than the predicted costs set out 
in the design or programme cost model when the programme started. These 
actual costs should be taken from the year most closely corresponding to the 
programme impact estimates. Ideally, costs, like programme impacts, should be 
measured after a programme has reached a steady-state. To the extent this is 
not possible, any programme start-up or set-up costs that are identifiable and 
included in the programme expenditure figures should be excluded in estimating 
the costs of an ongoing programme22. To identify these set-up costs, it may be 
22 Set-up costs are more likely to be charged in the first one or two years of the 
programme.
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useful to contact the Jobcentre Plus cost person responsible for these accounts for 
an explanation of the cost items included in the expenditure. 
The DEL-P programme expenditure amount for operational costs sets out 
the programme costs related to running the programme, while the Annually 
Managed Expenditures (AME) contains payments such as for training subsidies or 
transportation refunds. However, DEL-A contains the administrative costs and these 
are kept separately from these programme expenditure costs for some programmes. 
For other programmes, the DEL-A costs are not available or identifiable for the 
specific programme, but are grouped together with other administrative costs, 
and remain not included in the programme expenditure. Clearly it is desirable 
to include the administrative costs in a measure of the costs of a programme to 
avoid an underestimate of costs. Not including these administrative costs relies 
on the strong assumption that they amount to zero. However, it is likely that 
administrative costs are not trivial in size even if they do not form a great share of 
the programme costs. 
That the administrative costs are measurable for some programmes but not for 
others, and are, therefore, included in costs for some programmes but not others, 
can lead to inconsistencies across CBF CBAs. If administrative costs exist for a 
subset of programmes, it is better to use these than a broad assumption that is 
possibly invalid. Note that the administrative costs of some programmes may be 
much higher than others, and hence, each programme needs to be assessed. 
When the value of the administrative costs for a programme is missing, the first 
step should be to write a comprehensive list of what administrative tasks might 
exist for delivering this programme23. The next step is to then try to substitute in 
costs for these tasks, perhaps from cost data from other comparable programmes, 
and reach an estimate of the administrative costs. From the basis of the completed 
itemised list with available costings, a judgement can also be made of whether it 
is reasonable to assume that there are no administrative costs. The facilitation of 
DWP resource requirements for this task is not clear, however.
Any judgements, underlying assumptions, data sources and references for figures 
taken from other sources or publications need to be recorded in the CBA report, 
so that the validity of the figures can be assessed. 
4.2 How should childcare and travel costs be treated in  
 Cost Benefit Framework cost-benefit analyses?
It is evident that programmes that increase employment also increase work-related 
travel cost and, at least in the case of lone parents, childcare cost. These are costs 
to the affected individuals and, because such individuals are a part of society, to 
society as a whole. If the government helps subsidise work-related costs, they 
23 However, it may be difficult for all parties to agree the contents of the list, in 
the first instance.
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are also costs from the government’s perspective. Although these costs are not 
currently valued in CBF cost-benefit studies, it should not be too difficult to do so 
by examining survey information on what low wage workers spend on travelling 
back and forth to work and on the percentage of employed lone parents who use 
paid childcare and the amounts they pay. Until this is done, documents that report 
CBF CBAs should at least mention that these costs exist and could be of some 
importance. Childcare costs are especially likely to be relevant when programmes 
that target lone parents are compared to other programmes.
4.3 How should losses of leisure be treated in Cost  
 Benefit Framework cost-benefit analyses?
Individuals must give up time they use for other purposes when they go to work. 
This time is often called ‘leisure’, although it may, in fact, be used for productive 
purposes. Thus, ‘non-market time’ may be a better term. The key point is that 
leisure or non-market time may be of considerable value to those relinquishing 
it and, consequently, it is a cost to participants resulting from programmes that 
increase employment. Because these workers are also part of society, it is also a 
cost to society. It is important to recognise, however, that this cost does not fully 
offset the improvements in earnings that result from increases in employment. 
This can be seen in Figure 4.1, which represents an individual who is initially 
unemployed but finds a job because of participating in an employment and training 
programme. This individual’s labour supply curve is represented by curve S. In the 
absence of the programme, they would have a (potential) market wage of W* 
but would not be working. Assume now that as a result of participating in the 
programme, they obtain work at h* hours, although their market wage remains 
at W*. Thus, as a result of the programme, their earnings increase by areas A + 
B. However, the increase in earnings represented in area B is fully offset by the 
individual’s loss of leisure. Thus, only area A, the area above the labour supply 
curve, represents an increase in the individual’s surplus and should be counted as 
a true benefit of the programme. 
There is some previous research that implies that, consistent with Figure 4.1, the 
loss of leisure offset to the improvements in earnings that result from increases in 
employment is substantial, probably not less than a quarter of the earnings increase 
and quite likely more (Bell and Orr 1994; Greenberg 1997, and Greenberg and Robins 
2005). This suggests that in conducting CBF CBAs, or at least in conducting sensitivity 
tests of these analyses, it might be conservatively assumed that one quarter of the 
estimated increases in earnings are offset by losses in non-market time. 
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Figure 4. Value of lost non-market time for unemployed people  
  who find a job
4.4 How should deadweight losses from taxes be  
 treated in Cost Benefit Framework cost-benefit  
 analyses?
If employment and training programmes change the revenue flows from taxes 
received by the Exchequer, economic distortions that are caused by taxes also 
change. For example, taxes on earnings reduce incentives to work and taxes on 
investment reduce incentives to invest. These distortions (usually called ‘deadweight 
losses’ or ‘marginal excess tax burden’ by economists) result in substantial losses 
in economic efficiency. For example, after reviewing a number of US studies, 
Boardman et	al. (2006, pp. 428-429) conclude that the loss to the economy from 
each additional dollar of taxes that are collected in the US is in the order of 40 
cents or 40 per cent. Less evidence is available for the UK, but DWP economists 
have concluded that the efficiency loss from an additional pound of taxes in the 
UK is around 25 pence or 25 per cent.
In conducting the CBF CBAs, this 25 per cent estimate has been used to 
compute the effects of employment and training programmes on deadweight 
loss by multiplying it by estimates of programme impacts on the government’s 
fiscal position, which can be measured as net programme benefits from the 
government’s perspective. As shown in Table 1.1, net government benefits mainly 
consist of programme operating costs and programme-induced increase the tax 
payments of programme participants and decreases in their benefit receipts. Thus, 
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net government benefits from a programme can be either positive or negative. 
At least in principle, programmes with positive net fiscal benefits allow lower tax 
revenues than would otherwise be the case, thereby reducing deadweight loss, 
while programmes with net negative fiscal benefits require greater tax revenues, 
thereby increasing deadweight loss. It can be argued, however, that because the 
main intent of the CBF CBAs is to facilitate cross-programme comparisons so 
that funds can be shifted from less cost-beneficial programmes to more effective 
programmes, programme operating costs for all the analysed programmes 
combined would neither increase nor decrease as a result of the CBAs. To the extent 
this is true, estimates of deadweight loss are neither necessary nor appropriate. 
Although we consider this argument reasonable, it is only germane when the 
sole objective of CBA is to create league tables and then use them to compare 
programmes. CBAs that attempt to determine whether the net benefits of 
individual programmes are positive or negative should continue to incorporate 
estimates of programme impacts on deadweight loss. Moreover, it should be 
recognised that if funds are shifted from less cost-beneficial programmes to more 
cost-beneficial ones, then tax revenues received by the government will, in fact, 
change because the superior programmes will tend to have larger impacts on the 
earnings of programme participants and, hence, on their tax payments. Similarly, 
superior programmes would tend to result in greater reductions of payments 
under government benefit programmes. These effects would probably be fairly 
small, however.
On balance, we would recommend continuing to include estimates of deadweight 
loss in the CBF CBAs. In our view, doing so will result in better estimates of 
economic net benefits than not doing so. Furthermore, it seems somewhat peculiar 
to include estimates of deadweight loss in studies of individual programmes, and 
then ignore it in constructing league tables, and doing so may be difficult to 
explain. However, this is a close call; the case for inclusion is not strong. 
If deadweight loss is included, the computation of it should include the total 
programme effect on government revenues (i.e. the programme’s net benefit 
from the government perspective) because both the benefits and costs from the 
government perspective lead to distortions and deadweight losses. It would appear 
odd to ignore programme operating costs in computing deadweight loss but 
include programme effects on the taxes paid by and the transfer benefits received 
by programme participants. At present, the 25 per cent value mentioned above 
appears to be the best estimate that is available for use in computing deadweight 
loss, although 40 per cent might be used in conducting sensitivity analyses.
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4.5 How should general equilibrium effects  
 (e.g., substitution and displacement effects and  
 impacts on the wages of non-participants) be  
 treated in the Cost Benefit Framework cost-benefit  
 analyses?
The employment and training programmes that are assessed using the CBF 
guidance may have effects on the well-being of those who are not enrolled in the 
programme and, because of this, on the economy. Such effects include equilibrium 
wage effects, substitution effects and displacement effects. Empirical evidence 
about the magnitude of these effects is quite limited, however. Hence, in reporting 
CBAs that are conducted with the CBF guidance, general equilibrium effects are 
not often mentioned, and when they are, the discussion tends to be brief and 
somewhat speculative in nature. The latter approach seems appropriate given the 
lack of knowledge about the size of these effects. In other words, except in those 
rare instances when a reliable estimate exists, we suggest simply acknowledging 
the possible existence of general equilibrium effects and discussing whether they 
are likely to be important. In the remainder of this section, we consider what 
might be said about general equilibrium effects. 
If participants in an employment and training programme search harder for jobs 
or work more weeks or hours than they otherwise would, the resulting increase in 
labour supply will tend to lower the equilibrium wage within the labour markets 
in which they work. Thus, workers who are employed in the same labour markets 
as programme participants could receive lower wages than otherwise. For this 
effect to be very large, however, three conditions must hold: (1) the minimum 
wage must not constrain downward movements in wage rates; (2) programme 
participants must account for a fairly large share of the workers in the relevant 
labour markets; and (3) programme effects on job search and employment must 
be fairly large.
Most government programmes that provide training and/or help participants enter 
employment seem unlikely to bring about substantial equilibrium wage effects. 
Most participants who are employed because of the programmes tend to work 
in low-wage labour markets. Thus, at least to some degree, the minimum wage 
probably constrains reductions in equilibrium wages. Moreover, the programme 
target groups tend to be narrow (e.g. the disabled and people with serious health 
problems, the long-term unemployed, lone parents, etc.). Thus, members of 
these groups usually account for only a fairly small proportion of the total supply 
population in any given labour market. Finally, programme impacts are typically 
fairly modest.
Substitution effects occur if participants in a programme hold jobs that individuals 
who do not participate would otherwise have held. If these non-participants 
become unemployed or accept lower-wage jobs as a result, then their earnings 
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fall. Displacement effects occur if one firm expands at the expense of others 
because its employment costs are subsidised by the government. Despite these 
potentially adverse effects, there is very little research that quantifies their 
magnitude. However, a recent evaluation of the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP) provides a preliminary analysis of substitution effects that suggests they 
could be modest (Blundell et	al. 2002). Displacement effects are only relevant in 
the case of programmes that subsidise employment, and such programmes are 
relatively few in number.
The magnitude of the substitution effect is likely to depend on the state of the local 
labour markets. If a local labour market in which former programme participants 
work is tight, then alternative job opportunities are likely to be available to those 
outside the programme target group; but if it is loose, the cost of substitution to 
those affected could be substantial.
Issues in estimating additional costs resulting from programmes
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5 Other issues in  
 constructing cost-benefit  
 analyses using the Cost  
 Benefit Framework
5.1 How should participation in multiple programmes  
 be treated?
The issue of multiple programme participation is complicated. For example, the 
literature is not yet clear on how best to validly estimate the impact from multiple 
programme participation over time. There are some econometric techniques that 
attempt to isolate the impacts; however, as yet, these techniques do not resolve all 
the issues24. The CBA ideally needs a valid impact estimate to measure the benefits 
of the programmes. 
Some examination of the evaluation designs can assist. An important consideration 
is what participation the comparison group experiences. If the comparison group has 
no programme participation at all, then for the participant group, the participation 
rates for each programme will be important to assessing the average contribution 
to the impact arising from the multiple programme participation. In this case, 
a weighted average of the programme impacts, informed by the participation 
rates, might give a reasonable estimate of the overall impacts, if the impact of 
24 See, for example, Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2004), Lechner 
and Miquel (2002). In the end, however, a rigorous framework for the 
evaluation of second participation in the same programmes has not yet 
been developed. Up to now, a plausible approach for credible evaluation 
of the incremental effect of repeated participation has been discussed only 
theoretically by Lechner and Miquel (2002).
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each programme is known. An overall impact estimate would produce the impact 
of the overall mix of multiple participation that occurred. This is usually what is 
produced in evaluations of multiple component programmes, such as the Pathways 
to Work, where participants might have had a number of experiences from the 
alternative options. The participation rates for each programme are then important 
to inform what participation mix was contributing to the impact. Alternatively, the 
comparison group may have had some multiple programme participation as well. 
If the comparison group have, on average, gone through all the same programmes 
as the participant group, except for one particular programme, the impact would 
measure the net differential and reflect participation in that one programme only. 
The minimum that should be done in a CBA to examine multiple participation is 
to include an assessment of the scale of the issue, with how many go on multiple 
programmes, or who repeatedly participate in a programme over a period of time. 
This information should come from the evaluation of net impacts. 
Another aspect of the CBA is that of dealing with the costs for each of the 
programmes participated in. These should be summed, as the costs are incurred 
for each participation25. 
One issue is that many evaluations of programme impacts do not consider what 
history of programme participation the participant has outside of the current 
programme under consideration26. In this case, the benefits are considered to 
arise from only the most recently experienced programme participation. If other 
programme participations contributed to the final outcome then this is not a correct 
attribution and the impact is an overestimate of the effect of that programme. 
Again, getting a measure of the scale of other programme participation can inform 
whether the attribution of the programme impact is correct. 
5.2 Net benefits are currently measured from the  
 perspectives of the government and society. Should  
 any other perspectives be considered?
It has been common in cost-benefit studies of social programmes to estimate net 
benefits from three perspectives: that of the government, that of programme 
participants and that of society as a whole. In conducting the CBF CBAs to date, 
estimates are made of net benefits that accrue to the Exchequer and to the 
economy as a whole, but not to the people who participate in the programmes 
25 The benefits of the programmes are more complex and cannot necessarily 
be simply be summed. The assumption for summing benefits is that the 
programmes are independent. However, other alternative assumptions are 
possible.
26 In the case of considering the costs and benefits of earlier programme 
participation, if these took place in different years, then discounting needs 
to be done for the different years.
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being analysed. Thus, the CBF analyses to date assess benefits and costs from the 
first and third perspectives, but not the second.
The question arises, therefore, as to whether they should. If the CBF CBAs were 
mainly intended to separately evaluate individual employment and training 
programmes and determine whether each is cost-beneficial, it would be important to 
provide information on whether those who participate in the analysed programmes 
become better or worse off as a result. However, the analyses are mainly used to 
compare programmes, and it is probably not essential that these comparisons be 
made from the participant perspective. Nonetheless, such comparisons would be 
useful and easy to do.
The reason it would be easy to do is that, as a first cut, participant net benefits 
can be computed as increases in earnings and tax credits that are attributable to 
a programme less increases in participant taxes, reductions in participant benefit 
receipts, and increases in participant national insurance contributions resulting 
from the programme. All these elements are already estimated for purposes of 
computing Exchequer and economic net benefits. Note that this leaves out the 
value of programme impacts on health, crime, life satisfaction, the welfare of 
children, transportation, childcare utilisation, and non-market time. However, 
these impacts are also not currently valued in computing economic net benefits. 
If any of these were valued, they could also readily be included in estimating 
participant net benefits. 
5.3 Should distribution weighting be considered?
In the CBF CBAs, as well as in most other CBAs of social programmes, pounds 
gained or lost by programme participants (e.g. earnings improvements and 
reductions in benefits) are treated as identical to pounds gained or lost by the 
Exchequer (e.g. reductions in benefit payments and programme operating costs). 
It is sometimes suggested that they should not be. The reason is that changes 
in government revenue flows affect taxpayers and, on average, taxpayers have 
substantially higher incomes than participants in most of the programmes that 
attempt to influence employment and earnings. There is a considerable literature 
that argues that the gains and losses of lower income people should be valued 
more highly than the gains and losses of higher income people (see Annex 5 of 
HM Treasury Green	Book 2003 or Chapter 18 of Boardman et	al., 2006 and the 
references therein). One reason for this is that the value individuals put on each 
additional pound they receive (i.e. their marginal utility of income) is likely to be 
higher for low income people than for higher income people.27
27 For a discussion of additional reasons for treating high and low income 
people differently in cost-benefit analysis, see Chapter 18 of Boardman 
et	al., (2006).
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As suggested by the cost-benefit literature, this issue can be treated by giving each 
pound of the gains or losses of relatively low-income people a greater influence 
in CBAs than each pound of the gains or losses of higher income people. In 
principle, this would be accomplished by using so-called ‘distributional weights’ 
(for a summary, see Chapter 18 of Boardman et	al. 2006). For instance, the gains 
or losses of relatively low income people might be given a weight of two and 
those of relatively high income people a weight of one. The following simple 
illustrative example reports net benefits for two programmes (A and B) and shows 
how this can be accomplished:
Table .  How distributional weighting can affect programme  
  ranking
 Unweighted Weighted
 Programme Programme Programme Programme 
 A B A B
Participants £7 £3 £14 £6
Taxpayers or government £3 £9 £3 £9
Economy £10 £12 £17 £15
In this example, net benefits are presented for participants, the taxpayer or 
government, and the economy as a whole. Economic net benefits are computed as 
the sum of the net benefits accruing to the first two categories. Both unweighted 
and weighted results are presented, with the weights set to two for programme 
participants and to one for taxpayer and the government. Programme participants 
in the two programmes are given the same weight because it is assumed that their 
incomes are similar. As is true of most of the programmes assessed using the CBF 
guidance, most programme participants in both programmes are likely to have 
relatively low incomes.
The main point of the illustration is to demonstrate that the use of distributional 
weights can change the ranking of programmes when assessed from the 
economic perspective. As shown in the table, without weighting, economic net 
benefits are larger for Programme B than for Programme A, but Programme A 
dominates Programme B with weighting. Note, however, that when viewed from 
the perspective of the taxpayers or the government, the programme ranking does 
not change. It also does not change when viewed from the perspective of the 
programme participants, as long as the participants in different programmes are 
drawn from a similar income group. 
Distributional weighting is not widely used in CBA because the weights that are 
appropriate for this purpose are unknown and probably unknowable. Although a 
set of distributional weights can be found in HM Treasury Green	Book (2003), these 
weights are illustrative in nature and not based on evidence. Thus, we suggest that 
in conducting CBAs with the CBF guidance, weighting be limited to sensitivity 
tests. For example, it would be useful to see how the ranking of programmes 
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changes when weights of two for participants and one for all other groups are 
used. This weighting scheme, which is consistent with the weights found in the 
Green	Book, assumes that a pound received by programme participants has twice 
the value of a pound received by anyone else. This assumption seems sufficiently 
extreme to be useful for the purposes of a sensitivity analysis.
5.4 How should carefully done cost-benefit analyses  
 (e.g. that of New Deal for Disabled People) be  
 blended with those done quickly in-house under the 
 framework? Are they comparable?
Combining carefully done CBAs (which might be independently or internally 
constructed) with brief in-house CBAs can lead to variation in the quality of 
CBF CBAs. The variation arises because these brief in-house CBAs are generally 
constructed using more assumptions and less real data for components, for example, 
under the CBF guidance, a brief CBA would often construct the additional jobs 
estimate from the impact estimate and then apply the duration assumption of one 
year28 whereas in a carefully done CBA evidence on the duration of the impact 
would be used. To increase the comparability of the brief in-house CBAs while 
using the evidence base available, more variations and sensitivity analyses should 
be made. In addition, to examine the validity of the general one-year duration 
assumption for CBF CBAs where no other evidence is available, the evidence on 
duration of employment impacts from a subset of programmes should be explored 
to see whether this is reasonable. 
A difficulty with more carefully done CBAs is that they can be slow to be completed. 
A brief CBA can be constructed quickly. Where for a particular programme, an 
earlier brief CBA exists and a more carefully done CBA is completed, a comparison 
of their results can be made. This subsequent examination of how and why they 
differ, when both are completed, can provide useful information about the validity 
of assumptions and data item substitutions. The earlier in-house CBA should then 
be updated using information from the carefully done CBA. 
28 In application of the CBF to date, an assumption of one-year duration has 
been used where no evidence on impacts on job duration were available. 
Although it was not possible to assess whether this is reasonable within the 
scope of this report, the methods described in Section 2.6 can be used for 
this purpose.
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5.5 What sorts of sensitivity analyses of the Cost  
 Benefit Framework cost-benefit analyses might be  
 conducted?
The major objective of sensitivity tests of findings from the CBF CBAs would be to 
see if the ranking of the analysed programmes change very much when alternative 
assumptions are made in computing some of the key benefits and costs. Several 
sensitivity tests were suggested earlier in this report:
 Alternately using estimated impacts on employment and estimated impacts on 
being off benefits in determining the additional jobs resulting from the analysed 
programmes. (The core analysis usually relies on impacts on employment when 
they are available.)
 Making alternative assumptions about distributional weights in computing net 
benefits. For the purpose of the sensitivity tests, a weight of two could be 
assigned to programme participants and a weight of one could be assigned to 
taxpayers. (The core analysis implicitly assumes that the distributional weight 
equals one for both programme participants and taxpayers.)
 Alternately assuming that the loss of non-market time associated with each 
pound of increased earnings has a zero value and a value of 25 pence. (The 
core analysis assumes it has a zero value.)
Another sensitivity test that might be made (and, in fact, has been made) is to 
alter the assumptions about job duration. In the past, when existing estimates of 
job duration have not been available, it has most often been assumed that the 
jobs employment and training programme participants get typically last one year 
(see Section 2.6). However, there is great uncertainty surrounding this value. Thus, 
sensitivity tests might be conducted by first dividing the core assumed value in 
half and, then, doubling or tripling it29. In Section 2.6, we suggested two different 
alternative approaches for determining job duration. Use of these methods would 
reduce the uncertainty surrounding the length of job duration, but would far from 
eliminate it. Thus, if one of the suggested approaches is adopted, the resulting job 
duration values should still be subjected to sensitivity tests by first dividing them in 
half and then doubling or tripling them. 
A further sensitivity test that should be considered concerns the discount rate that 
is used in computing programme benefits, as the appropriate rate to use in CBA is 
a topic of some controversy (see Boardman, et	al. Chapter 10, and the references 
therein). As recommended by the Treasury Green	Book, the CBF CBAs use a value 
of 3.5 per cent in discounting benefits. Sensitivity tests could be conducted with, 
say, values of two per cent and five per cent. However, unless it is determined or 
assumed that programme impacts on employment and benefit reduction persist 
29 Other multiples can be considered, these are simple examples of what might 
be a useful point to start at for examining the variation.
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for more than a year or two, the CBF cost-benefit findings are unlikely to be very 
sensitive to the value of the discount rate.
5.6 What are the best measures of cost-effectiveness?  
 Should benefits and costs be divided by additional  
 jobs?
In principle, the results of CBAs are supposed to be used to apply the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, which stipulates that all policies with positive net benefits should be 
adopted. However, this criterion has to be modified, in practice, if the government 
does not have sufficient budget to adopt all policies with positive net benefits. 
Under these circumstances, net benefits would be maximised subject to the 
government’s budget constraint (for further discussion, see Boardman, et	 al., 
Chapter 2).
Even the modified Kaldor-Hicks criterion is not really applicable to CBAs conducted 
under the CBF guidance because these studies do not attempt to measure and 
monetise all the costs and benefits resulting from the analysed programmes. 
Hence, they cannot usually be used to determine whether net benefits are 
positive or negative, let alone the exact magnitude of the net benefits. Thus, as 
previously indicated, they are mainly intended to help guide comparisons amongst 
programmes. 
Because larger programmes tend to have larger costs and benefits than smaller 
programmes, however, it is difficult to compare them without first standardising 
for programme size. To facilitate cross-programme comparisons, therefore, 
costs and benefits are usually divided by some measure of programme size. For 
example, in reporting the results of CBAs conducted with the CBF guidance, net 
benefits are typically divided by the number of additional jobs resulting from the 
programme, thereby producing ‘net-benefit-per-additional-job ratios’. In addition, 
an alternative measure is usually also produced by dividing benefits by costs, 
producing so-called ‘spend-to-save ratios’. This second ratio is usually called the 
‘benefit-cost ratio’ in the cost-benefit literature. Both ratios provide estimates of 
the average cost-effectiveness of programmes.
Although such ratios facilitate cross-programme comparisons and hence, 
must be used in making such comparisons, great care should be exercised in 
interpreting them. For example, both the net-benefits-per-additional-job ratio 
and the spend-to-save ratio are potentially subject to so-called ‘scale problems’, 
which result because the marginal cost-effectiveness of a programme may 
differ from its average cost-effectiveness. To illustrate, consider a programme 
with benefits of £1m and costs of £0.5m and a second programme 
with benefits of £10,000 and costs of £1,000. The second programme 
obviously has a much larger spend-to-save ratio than the first programme 
(10 versus 2). It is not apparent, however, that its spend-to-save ratio would remain 
larger if the scale of the programme was increased so that £0.5m were also spent 
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on it. Thus, if a like-to-like comparison could be performed, it is not evident which 
programme would dominate. Similarly, it is not apparent that a programme that 
results in one additional job and net benefits of £10,000 would remain superior to 
a programme that produces 1,000 additional jobs and net benefits of £1m if the 
scale of operation of the two programmes were similar, although the net-benefits-
per-additional-job ratio of the first programme is ten-fold the size of ratio of the 
second programme (£10,000 versus £1,000). 
These examples do not imply that ratios should not be used in making cross-
programme comparisons. They simply suggest that caution should be taken to 
ensure that they are not misinterpreted.
Some care should be exercised in computing spend-to-save ratios. To illustrate, 
consider the administrative savings that occur when individuals leave benefits.30 
These savings can be viewed either as a benefit and added to the numerator of 
the ratio or as an avoided cost and subtracted from the denominator of the ratio. 
Although either approach is theoretically correct, cross-programme comparisons 
will be distorted unless the calculation is the same for all programmes. 
In a sense, the spend-to-save ratio is superior to the net-benefits-per-additional-
job ratio for purposes of comparing programmes. Costs reflect programme size 
but not programme success31, while the numbers of additional jobs that result 
from a programme are a function of both factors. Thus, when the number of 
additional jobs is used as a denominator in computing a ratio, the resulting figure 
is somewhat difficult to interpret. This does not occur when costs are used as a 
denominator because only project size is standardised. 
An alternative to using the number of additional jobs that result from a programme 
as the denominator in standardising for programme size is to use the number of 
programme participants instead. This is the approach typically taken in the United 
States. Like programme cost, the number of programme participants is under 
the control of policy makers and only reflects programme size, not programme 
success, in increasing job entry. Like the spend-to-save ratio and the net-benefits-
per-additional-job ratio, however, the net-benefit-per-participant ratio is also 
subject to scale problems.
When used in CBAs that are conducted from the perspective of the economy, 
the net-benefits-per-additional-job ratio is subject to additional issues that require 
extra care in interpreting them. To discuss these issues, we begin with a formula 
(shown below) that is used in CBF CBAs for computing economic net benefits 
(ENBs):
ENB = (∆J)(DA)(WA) – ∆C 
30 Although these savings are not usually estimated in conducting CBF CBAs, 
in principle they should be.
31 Programmes with funding that is determined, at least in part, by some 
measure of success are possible exceptions.
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Where ∆J is the number of additional jobs resulting from the programme, DA is 
the average duration of the additional jobs obtained by programme participants, 
WA is the average wage paid at these jobs and ∆C represents the additional costs 
engendered by the programme being analysed. The first term to the right of the 
equal sign represents programme gross benefits and the second term represents 
programme gross costs. The net-benefits-per-additional-job ratio would be 
computed by dividing both terms in the formula by ∆J:
NB/∆J = (∆J)(DA)(WA)/∆J – ∆C/∆J = (DA)(WA) – ∆C/∆J
As can be seen, this formulation has a rather peculiar property: programme gross 
benefits are simply the product of DA and WA and no longer reflect the additional 
jobs resulting from the programme. As previously discussed, DA is usually set equal 
to one or two years in CBAs that are currently conducted with CBF guidance. WA 
will tend to be fairly similar for most programme target groups as they usually tend 
to work at low wage jobs. If DA and WA do not vary very much among programmes, 
cross-programme comparisons will be driven mainly by variation in programme 
gross costs and some combination of programme scale and programme success 
in getting participants into jobs. Errors in measuring either ∆C or ∆J that are not 
constant across programmes will tend to distort cross-programme comparisons. 
Dividing net benefits by the number of participants in a programme, which is 
measured quite accurately from administrative data, rather than by the number 
of additional jobs that result, which, as discussed earlier, is especially subject 
to measurement errors, would help minimise the problems mentioned in this 
paragraph.




The discussion in the report recommends a number of steps that might be taken 
to improve the CBF CBAs. Some of these steps could be taken immediately and 
some can only be implemented gradually. Our recommendations are summarised 
below, along with an indication of where the discussion of each appears in the 
text. In making these recommendations, we distinguish between those that, in our 
view, should be given the highest priority and those that have a lower priority. We 
also distinguish between those that can be done relatively quickly and easily and 
those that can only be done over the middle or longer-term and, in some cases, 
involve considerable work and expense. It should be pointed out that only three of 
our high priority recommendations would take a long time to implement, and one 
of these is already being done on an ongoing basis. The remaining high priority 
recommendations are relatively easy and quick to implement. On the other hand, 
a considerable number of our lower priority recommendations would take some 
time to implement.
High priority/short-term recommendations
• Apart from ensuring net impact estimates on employment are made available 
for programmes as much as possible, where net impact estimates are missing 
documentation should be produced on the formulation and data sources, 
judgements and assumptions of any substitute information made as part of the 
CBA, and sensitivity analyses applied together with discussion of the implications 
of the weak evidence base for the CBA, when substitutions are made for net 
impacts (Section 2.3).
• When estimates of impacts on employment exist for multiple time periods, use 
the largest one for determining the number of additional jobs resulting from 
employment and training programmes (Section 2.4).
• When the impact on net earnings is unavailable for a programme, the substitute 
information that is used instead should be carefully documented and sensitivity 




• When certain benefits and costs are not incorporated into the estimates of net 
benefits, the implications of their omission need to be discussed in reporting the 
cost-benefit findings (Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and elsewhere).
• We do not recommend reporting estimates of the monetary values of programme 
impacts on difficult to monetise outcomes such as health, self-esteem, child-
welfare, and life-satisfaction until reliable estimates of these impacts become 
available (Section 3.2). 
• Drop the product market corrector that is currently used (Section 3.5). 
• Do not use a multiplier in estimating net benefits unless unemployment rates 
are high (Section 3.6).
• Use Jobcentre Plus historical annual cost accounts for the year closest to the 
programme impact estimates, and remove any set-up costs from these, to 
produce adequate cost measures where a cost analysis has not been done 
(Section 4.1). 
• Include DEL-A costs from Jobcentre Plus annual cost accounts where they exist 
for a programme, and when including them in the CBA divide by the number 
of programme participants to get a measure comparable across programmes 
(Section 4.1).
• Report judgements, data sources and assumptions for cost estimates together 
with discussion of any weaknesses in evidence and the implications for the CBA 
(Section 4.1). 
• In conducting sensitivity analyses, make alternative assumptions concerning the 
value of the loss of non-market time (i.e. ‘leisure’) that occurs when programme 
participants enter employment (Section 4.3).
• The likely importance or unimportance of general equilibrium effects should be 
discussed in presenting findings from the CBF CBAs (Section 4.5). 
• Sensitivity tests should be conducted of estimated net benefits to see if 
programme ranking changes when alternative assumptions are made. Section 
5.5 provides a suggested list of these tests.
• Strong consideration should be given to replacing the net-benefits-per-additional-
job ratios that are currently used to rank programmes with net-benefits-per-
participant ratios (Section 5.6).
• Although it is necessary to rank programmes on the basis of ratios, great care 
should be exercised in reporting and interpreting the resulting ranking because 
the ratios are inevitably subject to serious scale problems (Section 5.6).
High priority/middle- or long-term recommendations
• Ensure net impacts are estimated more often, for all programmes where 
possible, using valid evaluation designs, and timely consideration of the data 
requirements, particularly before the outset of a new programme (Section 2.1).
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• It is important to allow job duration values that are used in the CBF CBAs to vary 
by target group in a way that reflects how they actually differ, even when the 
precise values are unknown (Section 2.6).
• When an early brief CBA exists, together with a later independent or more 
carefully constructed CBA for the same programme, then the former CBA 
should be compared and updated. This is already done on an ongoing basis 
and should continue to be done (section 5.4).
Middle or low priority/short-term recommendations
• If estimates of impacts on being off benefits are used for determining the number 
of additional jobs resulting from employment and training programmes, they 
should first be adjusted, if possible, to allow for the fact that not all those 
leaving benefits as a result of employment and training programmes enter into 
employment (Section 2.5).
• Whenever possible, estimates of impacts on employment and estimates of 
impacts on being off benefits should both be used for determining the number 
of additional jobs resulting from a programme, with the former used for the 
core CBA and the latter used for sensitivity analysis (Section 2.5).
• An informed estimate of take-up of such benefits as Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
and CTB, based on further analytical information or microsimulation for take-up 
rates, would be better than the use of a 100 per cent assumption (Section 3.3). 
• Continue to include deadweight loss in estimating economic net benefits 
(Section 4.4).
• Brief in-house CBAs should include more variations and sensitivity analyses, 
particularly where any substitute information is used in place of impact estimates, 
so that they are more meaningful when combined with more carefully done 
CBAs (Section 5.4).
Middle or low priority/middle- or long-term recommendations
• A knowledge base should be developed of how job duration varies by target 
group and (to the extent possible) by programme. Section 2.6 provides 
suggestions as to how this might be done.
• As for Section 2.2, construction of net earnings impacts should be a requirement 
for evaluation designs for a programme as much as possible (Section 2.7). 
• Whenever possible, estimate the impacts of employment and training 
programmes on difficult to monetise outcomes such as health, self-esteem, 
child-welfare, and life-satisfaction. This may require the collection of new survey 
data (Section 3.2). 
• Use of a microsimulation model to obtain impacts on WTC, CTB, tax payments 
and NI contributions would be beneficial; however, the current tabular methods 
are adequate (Section 3.3).
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• Perhaps, begin to develop a product market corrector that is more appropriate 
than the one that has been used in the past (Section 3.5).
• For programmes for which DEL-A costs are unavailable from Jobcentre Plus cost 
account data, itemise administrative tasks for delivering the programme and 
find substitute costs for the tasks, perhaps from similar programmes (Section 
4.1). 
• Begin determining the increased costs of commuter travel and (for lone parents) 
childcare when programme participants enter employment (Section 4.2).
• Considering multiple programme participation, the net impact estimate and the 
evaluation design is important in defining what the net benefit is. Section 5.1 
considers how this can be approached. However, an important step is to ensure 
participation rates are examined for each programme for the participant and 
comparison groups. The costs of each programme should be summed. 
• Consideration should be given to ranking programmes on the basis of their net 
benefits to those who participate in them. However, it is not essential to do this 
(Section 5.2).
• Because great uncertainty surrounds the value of distributional weights, assumed 
values should be used in sensitivity analyses, but not in presenting the core CBF 
cost-benefit findings (Section 5.3).
A more general recommendation concerns ensuring consistency across the CBF 
CBAs. The CBF document, which provides fairly detailed information on many 
relevant topics, ensures a certain amount of consistency. However, as suggested 
below and as recognised by DWP, this document needs some revision and 
updating, in part to reflect recent changes in methods that are often written up 
in memos but not yet reflected in the document. Even more important in helping 
to ensure consistency is the fact that many of steps required to estimate the costs 
and benefits of each programme are completed centrally in Sheffield and only a 
few people are involved.
Nonetheless, in the research that we conducted in preparing this report, we found 
that documentation did not exist that described some of the steps involved in the 
CBAs. Thus, we could only determine the procedures followed by asking those 
involved. Not surprisingly, this lack of documentation and specification, which 
reflects the lack of time available to provide it and meet other responsibilities as 
well, resulted in some inconsistencies in how different cost-benefit analyses were 
done, especially in the case of work that was not conducted centrally.
Much of this variation involved determining the number of additional jobs resulting 
from each analysed programme, which, as previously indicated, is critical to the 
CBAs. Given the lack of documentation describing how this crucial step is done, 
the absence of procedures as to how it should be done, and the fact that it is not 
done centrally but by staff who are responsible for the various programmes being 
analysed and, hence, differ from programme-to-programme, not surprisingly, there 
was considerable variation in the manner in which the step was completed. For 
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example, estimates of impacts on employment were typically used for determining 
the number of additional jobs when they were available, but impacts on being off 
benefits were sometimes used instead, even when the former were available. 
Because the impacts were typically estimated for several time periods, there were 
also differences in which of the available estimates were used in determining the 
number of additional jobs. If impact estimates were not available, answers to 
survey questions were used to determine the percentage of employed programme 
participants who felt they would not have got their job without the programme. 
This percentage was then adjusted downward in unspecified ways prior to being 
used to determine the number of jobs actually resulting from a programme.
It would seem useful to specify in the framework document how the number of 
additional jobs should be determined when estimates of impacts on employment 
and benefits are available and when they are not available. Somewhat similar, but 
less severe, inconsistencies occur in determining the average wage paid in the 
jobs at which former programme participants are employed. Thus, the framework 





Protocol for interviews of 
the Cost Benefit Framework 
guidance
1. Please explain what you do in connection with the CBF work.
2. Which document(s) that we have been sent were you associated with?
3. For what purpose(s) do you think the CBA estimates made under the CBF 
should be used?
4. Could you explain how estimates of additional jobs have been obtained for 
the programmes you cover? What assumptions are made?
5. How have you obtained earnings estimates? What assumptions are made?
6. Could you explain how estimates of job duration have been obtained for the 
programmes you cover? What assumptions are made?
7. From what sources are the cost estimates used in the CBAs of the programmes 
you cover obtained? (Please define the three cost components: DEL-P, DEL-
A and AME.) Do you think this estimate is reasonable for the purposes at 
hand?
8. Ideally, what reliable measures of impacts would you like to have available 
for purposes of conducting cost-benefit analyses of the programmes you 
cover?
9. How do you think deadweight losses from taxes ought to be treated in the 
CBAs? Why?
10. What do you think about the product market corrector that the Treasury 
Green	Book suggests should be used in CBAs?
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11. Do you think any other perspectives than those of the fiscal and economic 
ones should be presented in reporting the CBAs?
12. Do you think the use of distributional weights should be considered? 
13. What sort of sensitivity test results, if any, should be reported along with the 
main CBA findings?




Cost Benefit Framework 
effectiveness calculations
The effectiveness calculations for the ‘overall assessment of effectiveness’ contain 
two main measures: 
• Net fiscal or Exchequer effectiveness (in £s): This is an estimate of the 
cost effectiveness to the Exchequer of using the programme. It measures the 
difference in the costs of a particular programme (the operational costs) and the 
benefits that flow back to the Exchequer in terms of increased tax revenue and 
benefit payments saved. 
• Net economic effectiveness in (£s): This measures the effectiveness of 
the programme on the economy more widely. It sets the benefits of increased 
output in the economy (produced by more people flowing into work) against 
the cost of running the programme. 
The effectiveness calculations focus on the additional benefits associated with 
those who find work who would not have done so without the help of the 
programme.
In measuring the net fiscal effectiveness, the following variables are included:
Benefits
• The additional income tax paid by former programme participants now in 
work.
• The additional employer and employee NI contributions.
32 The term ‘Economic’ is used as a label for this measure. The Green	Book	
uses the term ‘social’ but it is not used here as the calculations only include 
employment benefits and do not the quantified wider social cost and benefits 
identified in Section 5 of the supplementary measures.
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• The extra Value Added Tax (VAT) paid by those who have found work as a result 
of the programmes.
• The benefit payments and other entitlements saved since they left the programme 
for work.
Costs
• The operational costs of the programme.
• Any in work benefits paid.
The net benefit to the Exchequer is then calculated by:
i) estimating the fiscal Exchequer savings – additional taxes paid and the amount 
of total benefits claimed whilst unemployed or inactive is multiplied by the 
number of additional people into work. The benefits claimed and taxes used 
within the calculations are principle benefits (e.g. JSA, IS or IB), Housing Benefit, 
CTB, income tax, indirect tax, NI contributions. In-work tax credits are subtracted 
from the Exchequer savings; 
ii) subtracting the cost of the programme. 
The net benefits are then divided by the number of additional jobs to calculate the 
net fiscal benefits per additional job or by the number of starts to calculate the net 
Exchequer benefit per start.
To calculate the net economic effectiveness, we consider: 
Benefits
• The additional gross wages of those finding work as a result of the programme 
net of deadweight.
• Product market corrector figure to take into account firm’s profits on labour 
input when estimating output gains to the economy.
Costs
• The costs of running the programme.
In the past DWP has also included as a cost the deadweight cost of taxation – this 
reflects the fact that raising taxation to fund programmes impacts on work and 
output incentives in the wider economy.
To estimate the net benefit to the economy we:
i) estimate the value of increased output produced by additional workers by 
multiplying additional workers’ salary by a ‘product market corrector’ and the 
duration of the job; and
ii) subtract 25 per cent of the net fiscal cost (the deadweight cost of raising 
taxation). 
These net economic benefits (like the net fiscal benefits) are then sometimes 
expressed per additional job or per start.
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